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AN EXAMINATION OF CUT-OFF RATES FOR 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS UNDER 
CAPITAL RATIONING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The significance of capital expenditure ana lysis 
(1) How much money will be needed for expenditures in the coming period? 
(2) How much money will be available? (3) How should the available money be 
doled out to candidate projects ?1 
In these words, Joel Dean has described capital budgeting, this term being 
defined as the planning of capital expenditures. a Capital expenditure analysis is one 
facet of capital budgeting. Question one refers to the demand for capital to finance 
capital investment proposals that have been submitted to management for its con­
sideration. Question two refers to the various sources of funds which the firm has at 
its disposal to meet these investment proposals. It is the third question however, 
which is "the crux of the budgeting problem, the point where it becomes evident how 
much should be spent in total and where". 3 Once capital expenditure proposals are 
submitted for consideration, and the amount of resources available to finance them 
has been determined, management is still left with the task of answering this third 
question. To do this, a choice must be made between the projects competing for 
available funds. 
Evaluations can be made of these proposals, and that project or group of projects 
which best fulfils the goals of management is selected. A method for evaluating 
proposals is to use a quantitative model. Benefits and costs applicable to the various 
alternatives are expressed in monetary terms, and these alternatives are then analysed 
to determine which one yields the greatest increase in corporate profits. This quan­
titative evaluation is called capital expenditure analysis. 
1 Joel Dean, Managerial Economics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 555. 
2 A capital expenditure is defined as any outlay of funds which is expected to result in benefits 
accruing to the firm over a time period in excess of one year. 
3 Dean, Managerial Eco110mics, p. 555. 
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However, should this analysis reveal that a particular proposal produces the 
greatest increment in corporate profits, its acceptance does not automatically follow. 
Before making the final decision to accept a project, management must exercise judg­
ment in balancing profitability against any qualitative factors inherent in the proposal. 
These could be so unfavourable to the firm that they outweigh the financial profit­
ability of the project and lead to its rejection. 
Nevertheless, the quantitative appraisal afforded by capital expenditure analysis 
is essential in project evaluation and selection for two reasons. Firstly, if a proposal 
is rejected for various qualitative reasons, some measure of the profit lost to the firm 
through this decision is provided. Secondly, because capital expenditure analysis 
requires quantification of the benefits and costs associated with a project, it forces 
management to consider various projects at some depth before a decision is made. 
This second reason is extremely important, due to the nature of capital expend­
itures. By definition, a capital expenditure entails a current outlay in return for benefits 
to be derived in the future, but in waiting for these benefits to appear, the firm may have 
its capital tied up in a proposal for many years. Often capital may be recovered 
prematurely only at very high cost to the firm. The organization has lost some of its 
ability to adapt to future changes in business conditions, as a result of making a 
capital expenditure. In addition, capital expenditures are often subjected to a sig­
nificant degree of risk, so the possibility always exists that anticipated benefits on 
which a decision to accept a project was made, may not materialize. Therefore, 
because of these characteristics of capital expenditure, it is most important that 
current decisions to invest in capital projects be made properly. 
With the growing complexity and highly specific character of modern produc­
tion and marketing methods, investment decisions are becoming more irrevers­
ible. Thus investment decisions are increasingly determining the direction and 
pace of a company's future growth and limit the opportunities open to it in much 
the same way that the tracks determine the speed and directions open to a 
locomotive. This and the increasingly capital intensive nature of modern pro­
duction methods necessitate careful consideration of the methods used for 
investment appraisal4• 
Since capital expenditure analysis forces a detailed consideration of many 
aspects of a proposal, it can greatly assist in making the correct investment decision. 
Capital expenditure analysis and capital rationing 
For any individual firm, a situation could arise in which it either cannot or does 
not wish to raise sufficient funds for all capital expenditure proposals deemed profit­
able. In this situation, the firm is under a condition of capital rationing. Various 
empirical studies have revealed that such a state of affairs could be quite prevalent in 
the business community. A survey in the United Kingdom in 19645 indicated that 
over 50% of the 300 companies questioned were subjected to capital rationing, 
while in the United States, 80% of the respondents to a more recent survey6 of 163 
companies were constrained by varying degrees of capital rationing. 
4 A[nthony] J. Merrett and Alleu Sykes, Capital Budgeting and Company Finance (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1966), p.viii. 
5 Reported in G[erald] H. Lawson; "Criteria To Be Observed in Ju dgi ng a Capital Project- 11", 
Accountants Journal 56 (June 1964): 271-73. 
6 See Alexander A. Robichek, Donal d G. Ogilvie, and John D. C. Roach, "Capital Budgeting: A 
Pragmatic Approach", Financial Executive 31 (Aprill969): 32. 
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Perhaps of more interest to the Australian situation however, is research per­
formed by Meredith in 1964.7 In a survey of 285 Australian public companies , 
Meredith discovered that 61.2% experienced some form of capital rationing at that 
time. This capital rationing was experienced only occasionally by 47.6% and con­
sistently by 13.6% of the sample. 8 It was also found that rationing of funds was more 
prevalent in medium size companies than in those of larger or smaller size. 9 Meredith 
argued that this was caused by small companies having the smallest volume of capital 
expenditures, and. the largest companies having greater borrowing power than smaller 
enterprises . As a general conclusion he stated: 
Capital rationing is an important factor in the capital budgeting process of 
Australian public companies. The exact significance of capital rationing varies 
from company to company, depending on company industry and on company 
size. 1 0 
If the empirical evidence is a true indication of environmental conditions, then 
one would expect a discussion of capital rationing and its effects on project selection 
to be found in the body of literature concerned with capital expenditure analysis. 
However, only minor attention seems to have been paid to this problem. The only 
justifiable reason for this is that capital rationing does not exist at all in practice . 
With some notable exceptions ... the literature also disregards the case of 
capital rationing, usually on the ground that rationing ought not to exist when 
firms behave rationally (in the narrow economic sense).11 
However, the empirical research referred to above would suggest that firms do 
ration capital, so to rely on capital expenditure analysis  techniques which assume 
that unlimited funds are available may cause incorrect selections of projects to be 
made. In view of the significance of capital expenditure analysis in project appraisal, 
such a situation could be very harmful to the firm. 
Aim of the study 
This study will examine the effects of capital rationing on one special facet of 
capital expenditure analysis-the cut-off rate. The significan ce of the cut-off rate 
arises because it can be used to determine whether or not a project is profitable. By 
comparing the profitability of all projects with this rate, management can determine 
when it is uneconomical to continue making capital investments. A decline in the 
profitability of projects below this cut-off rate is usually a signal to halt expenditures. 
The cut-off rate plays an important role in the administrative control of capital 
project selection also. Lower levels of management can screen proposals using this 
rate, and those projects that are not acceptable quantitatively are not submitted to 
top management for final approval. 
In periods of slack investment demand, the cut-off rate can be used to avoid 
making marginal investments of low profitability. Funds are preserved for use when 
investment demand increases . However, in a capital rationing situation this would 
not occur since by definition the firm has too many profitable projects for available 
funds. 
1 G[eoffrey] G. Meredith , Capital Rationing and the Determination of the Firm's Performance 
Standards for Capita/Investment Analysis, University of Queensland Department of Accountancy 
Paper, Vol. I, No. 4 (1965), p. 114. 
8 Ibid., p.lOO. 
9 Ibid., p.99. 
10 Ibid., pp.99-100. 
11 H. Martin Weingartner, "Capital Budgeting of Interrelated Projects: Survey and Synthesis", 
Management Science 12 (March 1966): 485. 
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Although most of the discussion of cut-off rates under capital rationing will 
centre on theoretical issues, some consideration will also be given to practical 
applications of the ideal cut-off rates derived, because capital rationing is reported to 
be a practical issue affecting decision makers in the environment. 
However, it should be apparent from the previous section that this entire 
exercise would be pointless if capital rationing did not exist in practice. Meredith's 
research, carried out seven years ago, might not be currently applicable. To discover 
whether capital rationing is still experienced in Australia, a stratified, random sample 
of 172listed Australian public companies was surveyed by this writer, during Septem­
ber, October, and November 1969. The results of this survey are incorporated in the 
body of the study. 
Scope of the study 
It has been necessary for conciseness to restrict the scope of this study in the 
following ways: 
1. Only business organizations are referred to, and no mention is made of capital 
expenditure analysis by individuals. 
2. Capital expenditure analyses presented here show quantitatively the most 
profitable course open to the firm. It is then left to management to weigh this profit­
ability against any qualitative factors associated with particular projects to decide 
whether they should be accepted. 
3. Only capital expenditure analysis methods known as "discounted cash flow" 
techniques are discussed. Excluded are such non-discounting methods as payback 
and the accounting rate of return. Discounted cash flow techniques are now generally 
accepted as the best methods available, mainly because the time value of money is 
taken into account. 
The discounted cash-flow method for capital budgeting recognizes that the use 
of money has a cost (interest), just as the use of a building or an automobile may 
have a cost (rent). A dollar in the hand today is worth more than a dollar to be 
received (or spent) five years from today. For instance, in the interim a dollar 
can be invested in a savings institution; the dollar would grow markedly during a 
five-year span because of the interest it would earn. Because the discounted cash­
flow method explicitly and routinely weighs the time value of money, it is the best 
method to use for long-range decisions.12 
4. Only capital expenditure proposals subjected to negligible or equal degrees of 
risk will be considered.13 In this way, no adjustments need be made to the analysis of 
projects to compensate for risk. 
5. The only capital investment projects to be considered are all independent and 
divisible. The acceptance of an independent project does not affect other projects' 
profitabilities or chances of acceptance. Therefore, projects which are mutually 
exclusive are not considered in this study. Divisible investment projects are those 
requiring identical initial outlays. Investments which are of uneven size are not 
considered.14 
12 Charles T. Horngren, Cost Accounting: A Managerial Emphasis, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p.442. 
13 For a survey of the literature on capital expenditure analysis under conditions of risk, as well 
as other aspects of capital expenditure analysis, see Myles M. Dryden, "Capital Budgeting: Treatment 
of Uncertainty and Investment Criteria", Scottish Journal of Political Economy 11 (November 1964): 
235-59. 
14 Readers interested in the treatment of interdependent, indivisible projects under capital 
rationing should see Weingartner, "Capital Budgeting of Interrelated Projects", and H. Peter Holzer 
and John D. Forsyth, "Mathematical Programming and the Rationing of Capital: Last in a 
Series", Cost and Management 42 (March 1968): 21-24. 
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Out line of the stud y 
In section II, the nature of capital rationing and its prevalence in Australia are 
discussed. From the survey carried out by the writer, it is found that capital rationing 
is experienced. by a majority of listed Australian public companies. Some comparisons 
are made between this finding and those of Meredith. Capital rationing may be 
imposed either by factors external to the firm or by a desire of management to limit 
funds to a predetermined amount. The latter is found to be the most prevalent form of 
capital rationing. As a result of the findings of this survey, some evaluation of cut-off 
rates under capital rationing seems warranted. 
In section III an evaluation of cut-off rates under capital rationing is commenced. 
Discounted cash flow techniques under the assumption of unlimited funds are 
described, and the notion of the cut-off rate is elaborated upon. Under conditions 
of unlimited funds, this cut-off rate is usuall.y assumed to be the cost of capital. The 
predetermined cut-off rate is introduced and its value when all projects are not 
known in advance is demonstrated. The "conventional analysis" of cut-off rates under 
capital rationing is described and its limitations pointed out. Attention is then 
focused on one of these limitations, the effect that the goals of corporate profit 
maximization or ordinary shareholders' wealth maximization have on cut-off rates. 
This is achieved by analysing two-period investments under capital rationing. 
In section IV this analysis of two-period investments is used as a basis for 
examining cut-off rates with multi-period projects. These are investments with eco­
nomic lives in excess of two periods. The complexities caused by the frequency of 
capital rationing when evaluating these projects are discussed. Multi-period invest­
ments are thought to be more prevalent in practice than two-period investments, and 
data from the survey of listed Australian public companies are presented to show that 
the cut-off rates derived in this section are not used in practice. 
In section V, general conclusions to this study are offered. 
II. THE NATURE OF CAPITAL RATIONING AND ITS 
PREVALENCE IN A U STRALIA 
Int rod uction 
Before any investigation of cut-off rates under capital rationing can be attempted, 
it will be helpful to clarify just what is meant by this term "capital rationing" and the 
forms that it can take in the business environment. Knowledge of the incidence of 
capital rationing in Australian companies is also worthwhile, since there is little need 
for a description of detailed theoretical techniques for dealing with this situation if 
its current impact in practice is slight. 
Therefore, this section serves a twofold purpose. It discusses the meaning of the 
term "capital rationing" and the forms it can take, and in addition presents some of 
the results of a survey carried out by the writer into the incidence of capital rationing 
in listed Australian public companies. 
The meaning of the term "capital rationing" 
A "capital rationing" situation was defined previously15 as one in which a firm 
either cannot or does not wish to raise sufficient funds for all capital expenditure 
proposals deemed profitable. Whilst these words "capital rationing" intuitively imply 
some manner of constraint or limitation on available funds, the meaning attributed 
to them in disciplines other than Finance could cause confusion. 
15 See above, p.78. 
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One of the earliest instances of the use of the expression "capital rationing" was 
that of an economist, Albert G. Hart, in 1937. He referred to the limited ability of the 
firm to raise funds externally. 
Even tho [sic] there is no uncertainty of the terms of financing available, there 
may still be need for liquidity if those terms involve capital rationing: if, that is, 
the firm's ability to get in outside capital is limited otherwise than by the interest 
it must pay.16 
Hart recognized that it is the incidence of factors other than the borrowing costs of 
finance that cause a firm to suffer capital rationing. However, by stressing an inability 
to raise funds externally, implying that the firm wants to obtain more finance, he 
overlooked the possibility that the firm may limit the volume of funds available of 
its own accord. 
Since the writings of Hart, capital rationing has been discussed mainly by 
economists interested in cost-benefit analysis in government enterprises. The capital 
limitation problem here is a very real one, especially in those areas concerned with 
resource development projects, where many competing proposals vie for appro­
priations of funds from the central treasury. Two forms of capital rationing have been 
stipulated-"maximum rationing" and "specific rationing". This classification 
probably stems from the fund appropriation system in government, whereby depart­
ments of government are assigned a specified amount of resources to utilize in a 
financial year. 
Turning now to the word "rationing," there are at least two different ideas here. 
The first we might cali "specific rationing"; in this case the decision-making 
agent has a certain amount of current funds which he must dispose of through 
investment in projects yielding future returns. In the other case, which we will 
call "maximum rationing," the decision-maker can invest any amount up to, but 
not in excess of, the maximum amount indicated. This implies that some other 
use for the current funds is recognized as having value. For individuals, the alter­
native to investment of current funds is consumption; for firms, the alternative 
might be distribution of funds to stockholders; for departments of corporations 
or agencies of government, the alternative would be return of funds to the 
general treasury. The maximum rationing situation is obviously more interesting, 
being the more rational (or less irrational) of the two limitations considered.17 
However, even though the term "capital rationing" is used in this sense by these 
writers, it is not the meaning which it takes in this study. The definition given in 
section I implies that proposals under consideration are analysed to determine their 
profitability using capital expenditure evaluation techniques, whether discounted or 
not, and then those proposals deemed profitable are ranked against available funds to 
see whether there are sufficient finances available to accept all of them. "Specific 
rationing" as used by Hirshleifer, De Haven and Milliman implies that all funds 
allocated to a firm for capital expenditures must be spent, regardless of whether the 
object of the expenditure is profitable or not. This does not qualify as capital rationing, 
except to the extent that the funds limit is insufficient to meet all profitable capital 
expenditures. "Maximum rationing" suggests that funds may be spent on capital 
proposals up to the point where further expenditure would be no longer profitable. 
16 Albert G. Hart, "Anticipations, Business Planning, and the Cycle", Quarterly Journal of 
Eco11omics 51 (February 1937): 290-91. 
17 Jack Hirshleifer, James C. De Haven, and Jerome W. Milliman, Water Supply: Economics, 
Tech11ology, and Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 169-70. 
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Any excess funds are then returned to a central treasury to be reallocated to other 
government activities.18 Unless the limit to available funds is exceeded by the re­
sources necessary to meet all profitable capital expenditures, this "maximum 
rationing" is not a case of capital rationing as defined here. 
Therefore, capital rationing occurs where there are insufficient funds for all 
capital expenditure proposals deemed profitable. This shortage of funds may arise for 
two separate reasons. In the first instance, it may be imposed on the firm by external 
factors. Even though the firm wants to raise more funds to engage in profitable 
proposals, these funds cannot be obtained. This is called "external capital rationing" .19 
Secondly, rationing may be imposed by a desire of management to limit the amount of 
funds available for capital expenditures, even though sufficient funds are available 
internally or can be raised by borrowing. This situation is called "internal capital 
rationing". ao It was with this interpretation of the term "capital rationing" that an 
approach was made to the problem of gaining empirical evidence to determine its 
incidence in Australian public companies. 
The prevalence of capital rationing in listed Aust ralian public companies 
The survey 
During September, October, and November 1969, a survey of listed Australian 
public companies was carried out by the writer. The purpose of this survey was 
fourfold., being designed to examine: 
1. Whether the companies in the survey experienced capital rationing; and if so, 
2. whether capital rationing was imposed by management or by external parties. 
3. Whether these companies use discounted cash flow techniques to analyse 
capital expenditure proposals; and 
4. how these companies modify their capital expenditure evaluation techniques 
to deal with capital rationing. 
The population chosen Wl:J.S the 1,395 public companies listed on Australian 
stock exchanges at 30 June 1969, excluding any whose headquarters are overseas. 
This population was divided into the following 7 strata, each representing an industry 
group: 
Group 1 included all finance, banking, investment, and insurance companies. 
This stratum was given the general title "Finance Group". 
Group 2 included all companies involved in the conversion of raw materials into 
an "intermediate" product to be used later in the manufacture of a consumers' 
good. An example would be companies manufacturing pig-iron or plastics. The 
only exception to this was the inclusion of automobile and tractor manufacturers. 
This stratum was given the title "Heavy Industry Group". 
Group 3 companies produced consumer's products, for example electrical 
appliances, clothing, or foodstuffs. This group was called the "Light Manu­
facturing Group". 
18 "Maximum rationing" is adopted in French nationalized industries. Where the budget of one 
industry could only be exhausted by accepting unprofitable projects, its budget is shrunk and the 
excess turned over to another industry which has a profitable use for the funds. See Thomas Marschak, 
"Capital Budgeting and Pricing in the French Nationalized Industries", Journal of Business 33 
(April1960): 134-35. 
19 Harold Bierman, Jr., and Seymour Smidt, The Capital Budgeting Decision, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Macmillan Co., 1966), p. 182. 
20 Ibid., p. 187. 
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Group 4 included pastoral companies and companies involved in extraction 
activities, other than mineral mining and oil drilling. This group was called the 
"Primary Industries Group". 
Group 5 companies sold a product or a service to the public. Retail stores and 
television stations are examples. The general title of this stratum was "Trade and 
Service Group". 
Group 6 included mining companies and was called the "Mining Group". 
Group 7 companies were those engaged in oil drilling, exploration or extraction, 
but not oil refining. This group was called the "Oil Group". 
With the population split up into these divisions a stratified random sample of 
172 companies was selected, representing 12.3 % of the population of 1,395 companies. 
A questionnaire and covering letter were mailed to each of these companies during 
October 1969, and the replies received totalled 88. (A copy of this questionnaire 
appears in appendix IT.) Approximately one month later, a follow-up letter was mailed 
to those companies which had not replied. Of these, 40 responded to the follow-up 
giving the survey a total response of 128 or 78%. Not all these returns could be used, 
however, because many questions were incomplete or ambiguously answered, and 
some companies refused to answer. The usable response rate was 59.9% or 102 
questionnaires. The following table shows how the total response was divided. 
TABLE 1 
Summary of replies to the survey of listed Australian public companies 
No. 
Usable replies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . 102 
Ambiguous replies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
Incomplete or refused to answer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
Total 128 
The answers given by each of the companies responding to the follow-up appeal 
were carefully noted. It was reasoned that they were representative of all the companies 
not responding to the initial letter and questionnaire, so their results were weighted, 
in each stratum, to account for those companies which did not respond to the follow­
up. That some adjustment for non-response should be made is recognized by writers 
in the areas of sampling theory and practice. 
A survey population can be regarded as made up of two strata: respondents and 
non-respondents. Assuming that the sample was selected randomly in the first 
place, the former sub-population is adequately sampled. The problem is how to 
sample the latter, how to obtain some information about the people who do not 
complete questionnaires. There are several possibilities which can be applied 
singly or in combination: 
I. Follow-up requests, enclosing a copy of the questionnaire and covering letter, 
can be sent to the non-respondents. This invariably produces further returns and 
these not only increase the numbers available for analysis but can be used to 
improve the overall results. Suppose that 40 per cent of the sample members 
return the questionnaires in the first instance, that follow-up letters are sent to 
the remaining 60 per cent and that a further 15 per cent (of the total) return 
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questionnaires as a result. It is then reasonable to regard these 15 per cent as 
more representative of the non-response population than of the 40 per cent 
initial-response population; in other words, the figures for the 15 per cent group 
should be given a weight of 60 per cent in arriving at the over-all results. This 
is preferable to either (a) treating the initial 40 per cent as representative of the 
whole population and not bothering with follow-up attempts at all, or (b) 
combining the 15 per cent with the 40 per cent without giving them any extra 
weight (which would be tantamount to assuming that the still remaining non­
respondents--45 per cent-are no closer in characteristics to those who responded 
to the follow-up effort than to those who responded in the first place). 21 
Therefore, the results presented are given on the basis of a total response of 
172 or 100%, even though the actual usable response rate was only 59.9%. It is 
thought that more reliable statistics may be derived by using this procedure than if 
the unweighted total of replies was analysed. 
Some survey data 
In the survey questionnaire, companies were asked whether they suffered either 
consistently or occasionally from capital rationing. The question took the following 
form: 
2. In any one capital budget period has the supply of funds been sufficient to 
finance all the acceptable (profitable) proposals submitted for consideration? 
(1) Always sufficient funds available for proposals. 
(2) Occasionally capital funds NOT sufficient for proposals. 
(3) Never sufficient funds for all proposals submitted. 22 
There were 150 or 87.2% of the respondents who indicated that they experienced 
capital rationing either occasionally or consistently. The other 22 companies in the 
sample stated that they did not suffer from any shortage of funds. 
From this result, the 95% confidence interval for the percentage of all listed 
Australian public companies that suffer from occasional or consistent capital rationing 
was computed to be 81.8% to 91.2 %. This means one can be 95% sure that the true 
population percentage falls inside these limits. 23 
A similar survey, conducted by Meredith in 1964, revealed that 61.2% of Aus­
tralian public companies experienced capital rationing, either consistently or occasion­
ally. 24 The result obtained in the present survey seems to be significantly different 
from that obtained by Meredith. 
21 C. A. Moser, Survey Methods in Social Investigation (London: Heinemann Educational 
Books, 1958), p. 182. The method advocated here is not the only one available, but was considered to 
be the most practicable for this survey. 
22 This question was similar to that used previously by Meredith, Capital Rationing, p. 87. 
23 In any sample aimed at estimating some unknown population parameter, the statistic derived 
from the sample will probably differ from this true population parameter. To find limits within which 
the researcher can determine that this true parameter exists, with a known degree of error, a confidence 
interval should be derived from the sample. 
For a mathematical discussion of confidence intervals, reference may be made to the following: 
Moser, Survey Methods in Social Investigation, pp. 68-69; H. D. Brunk, An Introduction to Mathe­
matical Statistics, 2nd ed. (Waltham, Massachusetts: Blaisdell Publishing Co. of Ginn and Co., 
1965), pp. 174-87; and Frederick E. Croxton and Dudley J. Cowden, Applied General Statistics, 
2nd ed. (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, 1962), pp. 648-80, passim. 
24 Meredith, Capital Rationing, p. 98. 
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A cautionary note 
Before proceeding further, a cautionary note should be given. Many respondents 
to the survey indicated that they did not use discounted cash flow techniques for 
capital expenditure analysis, and few of those that did appeared to compute their 
firm's cost of capital . Instead, reliance was placed upon non-discounting methods 
such as payback and the accounting rate of return for capital expenditure evaluation. 
Therefore, the situation could have arisen in which respondents indicated shortages 
of funds due to the high cost of raising finance. As will be explained later, 25 the 
borrowing costs of finance are an element in the firm's cost of capital and this is used 
to determine project acceptability when discounted cash flow methods are used. In 
these circumstances, high costs of finance may render many projects unprofitable, 
but they do not give rise to a condition of capital rationing. 
Nevertheless, this survey was designed to discover whether firms experienced 
capital rationing as defined. It is permissible for companies stating that they did 
suffer from capital rationing to use their own criteria for proposal profitability analysis, 
provided they were short of sufficient funds to fulfil all the proposals that they deemed 
profitable. However, it should be remembered that, although between 81.8% and 
9 L.2% of listed companies experienced capital rationing, this confidence interval 
might have been set somewhat lower if all the firms in the sample had used discounted 
cash flow techn iques . 
Survey data analysed by industry group and by 
company size 
The data obtained from answers to the question concerning the incidence of 
capital rationing were also analysed by industry group, and the results of this analysis 
appear in table 2 on page 87. It seems that capital rationing is most prevalent in the 
Heavy Industry Group (92 %), Trade and Service Group (100 %), and the :rvlining 
Group (93 · 5 %), since the percentage of firms experiencing occasional or consistent 
rationing in these groups exceeds the sample average.26 
The sample data were also analysed by company size, and to facilitate this the 
sample was split into 7 groups , each group including companies with the same book 
value of assets. The results of this analysis are presented in table 3. It should be noted 
first however, that the data given are based on unweighted sample figures so the total 
number of companies in the table is 102, the usable number of replies to the survey. 
Since the sample was stratified on an industry group basis, it is thought that weighting 
these data on a company size basis would be fallacious . 
Bearing this in mind, most companies whose total assets range between 25 and 50 
million dollars or fall beneath 1 million dollars seem to experience capital rationing 
to a greater extent than firms in the other company size groups. Nevertheless , capital 
rationing appears to affect companies of all other sizes fairly evenly, and at a high 
level. This would seem to contradict the findings of Meredith who concluded that 
companies of medium size had a higher incidence of capital rationing than large or 
small companies . 27 
25 See below, p. 90. 
26 No confidence limits were derived for the individllal strata as WitS done for the whole sample, 
since the number of companies in each stratum is too small for these limits to be very meaningful. 
27 Meredith, Capital Rationing, p. 99. 
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TABLE 2 
Data showing the prevalence of capital rationing - analysed by industry group 
Industry group 
87 
----- ---c----
Financc 'I 
No. % 
Light : 
Heavy manu- Primary 
T
rade 
-
------------ -� --- -
and Mining Oil I Total industry facturing producers No. % No. % No. % service No. % No. % No. % No. % 
No 
capital 
rationing 
-�-
2
-6-�-8 11 23 
l-2--2-8-: 0 
--��--6.5 --�-1-:·:: 
Occasional 
m I consistent 
rationing 14 74 23 92 37 77 5 72 51 100 115 93.5 5 83 1 150 87.2 
Total
___ 
19 100 �- 25 �00 --�--��-� - �:- �--�:J 16--���--���:-� �-�- 10� 
TABLE 3 
Data showing the prevalence of capital rationing - analysed by company size 
Reply Company size 
------- Over- -$25 ______ $10-- -$5----, $2.5 ___ $1-Under _____ _ _ $50 million million million million million $1 
million to $50 to $25 to $10 to $5 to $2.5 million Total 
million million million million million 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
------------------------ --------- ----·--- -
No 
capital 
rationing 2 14 0 0 2 20 I 2 13 3 15.5 5 21 6 14 19 
Occasional 
or 
consistent 
rationing 6 86 9 100 8 80 13 87 16 84.5 19 79 16 94 88 81 
----- ---- ---- ---- ---- --- - --·--
Total 8 100 9 100 10 100 15 100 1 19 100 24 100 17 100 102 100 
Why do the results given so far appear to differ so markedly from those given by 
Meredith? Perhaps the following discussion may serve as an explanation . Meredith's 
research was performed at a time when the economy was still recovering from the 
effects of the "credit squeeze" of 1961, and was unaffected by the mineral boom 
which has had an undoubted influence on many parts of the current business com­
munity. Firms are now engaged in expansionary capital expenditure activities to a 
greater extent than they were then. This can be seen by considering table 4 which 
shows total new capital expenditures by private businesses since 1961. 
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Year 
1961 
1962 
1963 ... 
1964 
1965 ........... . 
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TABLE 4 
Total new capital expenditures by private businesses 
(Money amounts in millions of dollars) 
1966 ................ ' . ' . ' ' ' . ' . ' . ' . '  ' '  ' . .  ' . ' ' ' . ' .  ' . ' . ' . ' . ' . . . ' . . .  ' .... . ' 
1967 .. ' 
1968 '.' 
1969 
$ 
220.0 
215.6 
245.0 
245.4 
308 . 8 
388.7 
367.8 
404.2 
449.0 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Seasonally Adjusted Indicators 1969 
(Canberra: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 73. 
As will be explained later, 28 where there is an imperfect market for funds like the 
Australian capital market, firms can experience conditions of capital rationing. This is 
especially evident where many demands are being made on this market for funds. 
Since more capital expenditures are being undertaken now than previously, resulting 
in increasing fund requirements, it seems reasonable to assume that a higher incidence 
of capital rationing could prevail in our present environment than that found by 
Meredith. 
Conclusions 
The survey data have indicated that capital rationing is experienced by 87.2% 
of the companies sampled and the 95% confidence interval for the percentage of all 
listed Australian public companies is 81.8% to 91.2 %. In the remainder of this section, 
the total incidence of capital rationing is analysed to determine the extent to which 
it is imposed externally or internally. 
External capital rationing 
It is thought that external capital rationing is caused by imperfections in the 
capital market. Where the market for funds is purely competitive, the firm would be 
just one of a vast number of small enterprises requiring capital resources. This market 
is so vast compared with the size of any firm that borrowings can be made in un­
limited amounts. No risks are incurred by the lender in advancing funds to borrowers 
and the future is known with absolute certainty. In such a situation, the firm is able 
to borrow at a constant rate of interest since no single firm can influence this market 
rate. Any surplus funds held by the firm may be loaned at this same constant interest 
rate. The market rate of interest becomes the firm's cost of capital. 
So long as one of the main assumptions of most of capital theory is granted, 
namely, that capital markets are perfect and that the decision-maker may 
borrow or lend without constraint at the (given) market rate of interest, then the 
correct value for the cost-of-capital was [sic] simply the market rate of interest. a9 
28 See below, p. 90. 
29 Dryden, "Capital Budgeting", p. 245. 
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This market rate of interest is the cost of capital regardless of whether the firm obtains 
its funds through issues of shares or debentures.  
Note that . . .  the cost of capital is  equal to the rate of interest on bonds, regardless 
of whether the funds are acquired through debt instruments or through new 
issues of common stock. Indeed, in a world of sure returns, the distinction 
between debt and equity funds reduces largely to one of terminology. 30 
Capital markets are seldom purely competitive, however. There always seem to be 
imperfections inherent in the structure of such markets which make the goal of pure 
competition an unattainable one. These imperfections can cause the borrowing rate of 
irterest to fluctuate and differ among firms . It may be possible to influence the market 
so that funds are obtained on very favou rable terms.  Large firms may be able to 
approach the market with this result, but smaller enterprises may only be able to 
obtain funds at costs which increase with each additional increment of borrowings. 
Lower risks associated with the activities of big well-established firms in stable 
industries, as opposed to higher risks with smaller firms, account for much of these 
divergencies .  
In addition, the presence of an imperfect capital market causes difficulties in 
estimating the costs of capital for an individual firm. Different forms of finance, such 
as debentures and short-term loans, may have different explicit costs, while there is a 
problem in determining the costs of ordinary shares and retained earnings which do 
not have explicit costs. 31 However, once these costs have been discovered, it is possible 
to combine them into an overall weighted average cost of capital for the firm. This 
can be based on an ideal capital structure, with the costs of each source of finance 
weighted to reflect the extent of its presence in this capital structure. A weighted 
average approach to cost of capital such as this, is  preferable to treating the costs of 
individual sources of funds separately. 
If we tried to associate each source of funds with a particular investment, we 
would have the chaotic situation in which a machine might be purchased with a 
rate of return of 3 percent because it was "financed with debt" during the month, 
while a machine offering a 20 percent return might be rej ected next month because 
it would have to be "financed by a new issue of common stock." Although the 
cost of capital may change over time, its level at any one moment should not be 
dependent upon the current block of new financing. 
But there is still another reason why we should view the cost of capital as a 
j oint cost-a cost of a mixture of debt and equity. While a firm does not often 
float issues of debt and common stock in combination, each issue of debt is 
nonetheless dependent upon some equity base . . .  Our capital is made available 
on a "package deal" basis, and it is the future cash payments that we must make 
on the entire mixture of capital sources that constitute our cost of capital. a a 
As more and more finance is obtained from th e capital market, the average cost of 
capital eventually rises for many firms. A supply curve for capital can be drawn 
similar to the SS curve in figure 1 ,  but the exact shape varies according to the size of 
the company and the exact imperfections inherent in the capital market. 
30 Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and 
the Theory of Investment", American Economic Review 48 (June 1 958) : 262. 
31 Actual measurement of the costs of these different sources of finance is beyond the scope of 
this study, but interested readers may refer to Robert W. Johnson, Financial Management, 3rd ed. 
(Boston : Allyn and Bacon, 1 966) , pp. 275-91 ,  and James C. Van Horne, Financial Management and 
Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 109-1 39.  
32 Johnson, Financial Management, pp.  285-86. 
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Fig. ! .-External capital rationing 
Amounts of finance are shown on the x-axis and the average costs of this are shown 
on the y-axis .  As will be seen l ater, 33 the cost of capital curve SS is used to determine 
the profitabil ity of projects under consideration. However, it shall be assumed for the 
present that projects requiring OA funds have been deemed profitable . Obtaining 
OA funds necessitates borrowing from the capital market to add to those funds 
already possessed by the firm, which are shown on the diagram as OC. The volume of 
funds to be b orrowed is therefore CA. However, beyond CD the firm is unable to 
obtain any funds at all  and is facing an effective borrowing rate of interest which is 
infinitely high. Thi s is shown by the b orrowing curve for funds BB which becomes 
vertical at the limit of external borr owings. (The b orrowing curve shows the costs of 
obtaining funds through issues of debt or equity .) The firm is then said to be under a 
condition of external capital rationing. Thus, although profitable projects would 
utilize funds up to OA, external capital rationing results in insufficient funds being 
obtained to engage in all of them. 
· 
The nature of external capital rationing having been discussed, consideration will 
now be given to its incidence in Australia, and to a discussion of some reasons under­
lying the market imperfections giving rise to this condition.  
Incidence in Australia 
External capital rationing seems to apply to some firms only, since many respon­
dents to the survey indicated that they did not experience any difficulty in raising 
funds externally. The group surveyed were asked the following question : 
7. Is capital rationing in your company 
(1)  Caused by a desire of management to l imit funds for capital expenditure 
proposals ? 
(2) Caused by restrictions being placed on the Company by extern al bodies ? 
(3) Caused by both these factors ? 34 
33 See below, p. 103.  
34 Further discussion of this question will be given in the section on internal capital rationing. 
See below, pp. 94-95.  
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There were 7 companies that checked part 2 of thi s question indicating that they 
experienced external capital rationing alone, while 6 1  respondents checked part 3 ,  
indicating that they suffered both internal and external rationing. Therefore, the total 
number of companies experiencing external capital rationing was 68 ,  or 39. 5 % of the 
total sample. 3 5  
These results suggest that some inability to raise funds externally affects less than 
half of the companies sampled, and demonstrates that imperfections in the capital 
market only affect s ome firms. Others have no trouble obtaining external finance . 
These facts are brought to light more clearly when the data are analysed by industry 
group in table 5 .  
TABLE 5 
The percentage of companies sampled suffering from external capital rationing 
Industry Group Percentage 
Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
Heavy Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
Light Manufacturing . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1  
Primary Producers .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4  
Trade and Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6  
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69  
O i l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67 
A higher than average incidence of external capital rationing appears to exist in the 
Mining and Oil Groups, while the other groups seem to experience this form of 
rationing to a lesser extent. 
Some reasons for market imperfections and some empirical evidence 
The higher than average incidence of external capital rationing in the Mining and 
Oil Groups can be explained by the unprecedented surge of activity in those areas 
over the last few years. The capital market is  attracted to glamour capital issues in 
these areas, while companies with less exciting prospects are disregarded and their 
bids for new funds thwarted. This boom appears to have had little impact on the 
ability of firms in other areas to obtain funds, suggesting that this effervescence is 
being sustained only by the activation of investors'  idle cash balances in saving banks, 
government bonds and the like.  Resources do not appear to have been channelled 
away from the "industrial" section of the stock market to any extent. 
On the other hand, a higher than average incidence of external capital rationing 
in the Mining and Oil Groups could reflect caution on the part of some lenders.  
Institutional lenders may refuse to advance loans to companies engaged in activities of 
doubtful profitability, such as mineral exploration, because the risk associated with 
the loan is very high. This is accentuated where the past performance of the borrower 
is poor. 
The poor profit record, however, may make it extremely costly if not totally 
impractical to raise further equity capital. Attempts to float a new equity issue at 
a time when the market is doubtful whether the firm can earn a worthwhile 
35 The 95 % confidence limits for the percentage of all listed Australian public companies 
suffering external capital rationing are 3 3 .9 % and 45. 6 % .  
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return on the new equity may lead to a serious collapse in the price level of the 
firm's shares. At the same time, the poor record may also make it extremely 
difficult for the firm to obtain further debt capital . 36 
However, this would not be a case of capital rati oning if the companies in question 
computed their costs of capital, since the risk inherent in a particular use of funds is  a 
determining factor in this figure, 37 and the firm's cost of capital is used to determine 
project profitability . Nevertheless ,  for companies not computing their costs of capital, 
it is  permissible to state that external capital rationing is  suffered for this reason . 
Even where the risk associated with a particular company' s activities is not high , 
financial institutions may be unwilling to advance funds to a firm beyond a fixed limit, 
determined as a percentage of the book value of the company' s assets .  
Nevertheless,  the firm cannot go on borrowing indefinitely, because lenders 
alway s insist on a comfortable margin of safety and do not lend the full amount 
that the assets pledged as security are worth. Accordingly , the funds that the 
producer is able to borrow are l imited to a certain proportion (or multiple) of his 
own funds invested in his enterprise. 38 
Inability to obtain funds may be caused by the size of the capital market relative 
to the size of companies which borrow from it . Some organizations needing large 
sums of capital to embark on major expansionary projects could discover that their 
requirements exceed the ability of the market to cater for them . Such a situation could 
arise in a developing nation where a large company has been formed to establish some 
basic industry, such as steel production. The capital requirements of this company 
coul d be so great that the market for funds is too small to handle it and the company 
faces a condition of external capital rati oni ng. Again,  even in a developed nation, "the 
flow of commercially viable projects resulting from technologiCal progress may out­
weigh the ability of even the giant corporation to raise or generate finance" . 39 
Frictions in the capital market are another form of market imperfection and may 
cause external capital rationing A firm which is seeking additional funds to finance 
profitable investment projects may discover that the market knows nothing about its 
capital needs,  and strenuous efforts have to be made to find borrowers to advance 
funds. Alternatively, the firm and its fund requirements may be well known to 
borrowers, but there is a lag between the time the firm initially announces its intention 
to raise funds, and the time its requirements are fully satisfied . In both cases, a 
company may find itself temporarily in a situati on of external capital rationing . 
Other factors could cause the firm to suffer external capital rationing for con­
siderable lengths of time. During periods of adverse economic condition s ,  general 
pessimism in the business community could result in an unwillingness to advance 
funds to borrowing companies, a situation lasting until the prospects for general 
prosperity brighten. Lenders who are u sually willing to advance money during times of 
plenty are too cautious to risk their funds during recessions because they desire to 
keep a security buffer of liquid funds available to meet their own economic problems.  
Borrowers may also postpone their attempts to raise funds during these peri ods, and 
may be content to wait for a general improvement in the condition of the economy 
before going to the market again. 
36 A[nthony] J.  Merrett and Allen Sykes, The Finance and Analysis of Capital Projects (London : 
Longmans, Green and Co. ,  1 963), p. 140. 
37 See Johnson, Financial Management, pp. 276-78, and Van Horne, Financial Management and 
Policy, pp. 1 36-39. 
38 Tibor Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition: The Economics of a Fully Employed Economy 
(London : Unwin University Books, 1 952), p. 200. 
39 G[erald] H.  Lawson and D. W. Windle, Capital Budgeting and the Use of DCF Criteria in the 
Corporation Tax Regime (Edinburgh and London : Oliver and Boyd, 1 967), p.  56. 
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To see whether some of these market imperfections exist in Australia, companies 
in the survey were asked the following question : 
8. If capital rationing is caused by external factors, are these 
( 1) Difficulties in obtaining funds from 
(a) banks and short-term creditors 
(b) the issue of debentures 
(c) the issue of new shares.  40 
The results of data from this question are displayed in table 6 .  
TABLE 6 
Some reasons for external capital rationing 
------ - - - ---- - ----- --------- -- ----- -
Source of difficulty in Number Percentages 
obtaining funds 
To total sample To number of 
companies sufferin g 
external capital 
rationing 
Banks and short-term creditors 36 20 .9  52.9 
The issue of debentures 2 1 .2 2.9 
Th e issue of shares 1 8  1 0 .4 26.4 
Notes: The 95 % confidence limits for the population proportion suffering these difficulties in obtain­
ing funds from these sources were : 
(i) Banks and short-term creditors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 5 . 8 % and 27.2 % 
(ii) The issue of debentures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0 .55 % and 24. 1 9 %  
(iii) The issue o f  shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . 6.9 % and 1 5 . 5 % 
It can be observed that j ust over 50 % of all companies suffering external capital 
rationing experience difficulties in obtaining ban1c loans and short-term credit. This 
could lend support to the earlier observation41 that lenders advance funds on1y up to 
a certain proportion of the assets of the borrowing company . For instance, an appli­
cation to a bank for an additional overdraft could be rej ected because, in the opinion 
of the bank manager the borrower already had too much bank credit for the value of 
its assets. 
Imperfections caused by restrictions on the firm 
Another form of imperfecti on in the capital market is restrictions imposed on 
individual companies by external parties .  Equity holders and debenture holders can 
place these restrictions on the finn, but they can als o  be imposed by government 
authority. 
The provisions of existing debenture trust deeds may prohibit the firm from 
issuing further debt, and may strictly govern the terms and n.ature of short-term credit 
available to the finn. Restrictions imposed by existing equity holders may occur in 
40 This is part 1 of question 8 on the survey questionnaire. The remainder of this question and 
the results from it will be given later in the section. See below, p. 94. 
41 See above, p. 92. 
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the case where the company is  a wholly- owned subsidiary of another. The parent may 
enforce strict guidelines as to the amount of capital available for proposals, or i t  
may expropriate large portions of the subsidiary's  annual profits as dividends, 
leaving it devoid of any funds . The parent company could also forbid the subsidiary ' s 
obtaining capital externally, by equity or debt issues. A s imilar situation could arise 
where the enterprise under consideration is a division of a larger firm, or where the 
enterpri se is controlled by a strong group of individual shareh olders .  
Where the company is  a government public  enterprise,  or is a member of a 
nati onalized industry, it is subj ected to restrictions by governmental authority . A 
public utility , for example, has funds available for capital expenditures voted to it in 
annual appropriations by parliament. Even though the leaders of such organizations 
can l obby strongly for more funds, determination of the amount finally granted to 
them each year is beyond their control . In the case where a public utility i s allowed to 
raise funds directly from the capital market, its ability to do so would be closely 
governed . 4 2  
Company law forbids some enterprises from gaining access t o  the capital market 
and thus l imits the funds available to those generated internally. For example, the 
proprietary company is forbidden by law to offer shares to the public or to issue 
debentures . 43 A condition of external capital rationing could affect one of these 
companies to such an extent that it i s  forced to convert itself to public company status 
to obtain external cap ital . Proprietary companies were not included in the population 
of companies sampled, so no data are available to support these claims .  However, 
companies in the sample were asked whether they experienced restricti ons imposed by 
some external parties . The specific question was : 
8 .  If capital rationing is caused by external factors,  are these 
(2) Restricti ons imposed on the firm by Government authority ? 
(3) Restrictions imposed by existing debenture trust deeds ? 
There were 8 resp ondents who indicated that they had difficulty obtaining funds 
because of restrictions imposed by debenture trust deeds. This represents 4. 7 %  of the 
t otal sample and 1 L 7 %  of those companies experiencing external capital rationing. 
Fourteen companies,  or 8 . 1 % of the total sample, and 20.6 % of those respondents 
experiencing external rationing, indicated that they were inflicted with restrictions 
from government authority. 
Conclusions 
External capital rationing is caused by imperfections in the capital market, 
the result of s everal factors which have been mentioned here. From the survey, 
this form of capital rationing seems to be imposed on a minority of Australian public 
companies, although in the Mining and Oil Grou ps its incidence is  higher than average . 
In most cases, external capital rationing is an occurrence for which the firm can do 
little el se except wait until its requirements for funds are met. 
Attention is now directed to the other form of funds restriction-internal capital 
rationing. 
I nternal  capital rat ion ing  
I n  the case o f  internal capital rationing, there are profitable proj ects available 
and a ready supply of funds to engage in them, but management stipulates that only a 
---- ------ --
42 The structure of government finances is exp lained in W. R[obert] C. Jay and R[usseUJ L. 
Mathews, eds . ,  Government A ccounting in A ustralia: A Book of Readings (Melbourne : F. W. Cheshire 
1 968), passim. 
· 
43 Companies Act, 1961 (Queensland) sec. 1 5 , 1 (c). 
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certain amount will be available in any year for capital expenditures. Some writers 
had guessed intu itively that this form of capital rationing was the most prevalent, 44 
and the results of the survey seem to bear out their observations. One of the questions 
asked was : 
7. Is capital rationing in your company : 
( 1 )  Caused by a des ire of management to limit funds for capital expenditure 
proposals ? 
(2) Caused by restrictions being placed on the company by external bodies ? 
(3) Caused by both these factors ? 4 5  
There were 83  companies which checked part 1 o f  this question, demonstrating 
that they experienced internal capital rationing alone, while 6 1  companies checked 
part 3 of the question indicating that they suffered. from both internal and external 
capital rationing. Thus a total of 1 44 respondents suffered from internal capital 
rationing. This represented. 83 .7 % of the total sample and 9 5 . 3 % of those companies 
experiencing capital rationing in all forms. 46 
The information derived from the sample was also analysed by industry gro up, 
and the results appear in table 7. 
TABLE 7 
The incidence of internal capital rationing :  analysed by industry group 
------------ --�---- --- ------ - --- - ----
Industry group 
Finance 
Heavy Industry 
Light Manufacturing 
Primary Producers 
Trade and Service 
Mining 
Oil 
Percentage of the 
sample under 
internal cap ital rationing 
% 
42 
88 
77 
7 1 
100 
94 
84 I 
Percentage of companies 
under internal 
capital rationing to 
those under rationing 
in all forms 
% 
6 1  
96 
97 
100 
1 00 
100 
1 00 
---------- -- ---·- -
-- ---- --------· --- -- -- -------
Internal capital rationing seems to be very prevalent in all industry groups other 
th an finance. 
Methods of imposing internal capital rationing and reasons for its existence 
Capital rationing may be imposed. internally in four different ways .  Firstly, there 
could be a stipulation by management that the firm will not borrow funds from the 
capital market, but will be content to finance proj ects from retained earnings . Internal 
capital rationing arises in this case where total internally generated funds are in­
sufficient to finance all projects deemed profitable. 
44 See Meredith, Capital Rationing, p. 90, Merrett and Sykes, The Finance and Analysis of 
Capital Projects, p. 140, and Gerald H. Lawson, "Capital In vestment Criteri a  in Business-ll", 
Accountant 148 (April 1 963) : 491 . 
45 This question was used earl ier in the discussion of external capital rationing. See above, p. 90. 
46 The 95 % confidence limits for the propo rtion of the population that experiences internal 
capital rationing are 77.7 % and 88.5 /';;. 
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For many firms it is a source of pride that they never go to the market for 
financing a new opportunity, no matter how profitable it appears. They determine 
the amount of capital available for new schemes not on the basis of earning 
prospects, but on the basis of availability of cash from retained earnings above 
the balance needed to meet the ironclad standards for the current ratio. 47 
On the other hand, if use of external funds is permitted, the type of borrowings made 
and their rate of occurrence are strictly governed. For instance, some firms may refuse 
to issue long-term debt, and may allow borrowing from banks only at certain times 
during the year. 
Secondly, capital rationing arises where there are plenty of internally generated 
funds available, but management sets an upper limit to their use in capital expenditures. 
Often this takes the form of a limit equal to annual depreciation charges plus a pro­
portion of current earnings less dividends payable, and in some firms, the limit may 
not vary from year to year. In others, the exact amount set depends on the avail­
ability of projects and their profitability. 
There are no hard-and-fast rules to be found in practice regarding the selection of 
an over-all constraint. The net present values (or some similar measure such as 
time-adjusted rate of return) may strongly influence the over-all budget amount. 
For example, a flock of projects with huge net present values would probably 
result in a much higher over-all budget than would a group of projects that all 
slightly exceeded zero. 48 
Thirdly, management may ration capital by setting a cut-off rate for project 
acceptability higher than the firm's cost of capital, or other minimum rate of profit­
ability. This results in a smaller number of projects being accepted . Although this 
procedure does not predetermine the amount to be spent on capital proposals in any 
year, its use in examining projects achieves the same result. 
Fourthly, capital limitations may be imposed by management on certain areas of 
the firm, or for certain classes of project, while the other capital expenditure activ­
ities are left intact. Management of a divisionalized enterprise may state that ex­
pansionary projects in one segment, or for the entire firm, are to be limited to a 
certain sum of money, and replacement proposals for the entire firm or a segment 
are cut short after a set volume of funds has been expended . 
While the writer's survey of Australian public companies did not ascertain 
whether internal capital rationing was executed by any of the first three methods, it 
did attempt to discover whether this fourth procedure was in evidence in the environ­
ment. Companies in the sample were asked : 
9. Does your company limit funcls available for capital expenditure proposals in 
specific areas and not others ? 
1 .  Yes 
2 .  No 
3 . Sometimes 
There were 45 respondents who indicated "Yes" to this question and 4 1  checked 
"Sometimes" ,  making a total of 86 companies or 50 % of the sample4D that limit 
funds available to specific areas of their organizations at some time. 
47 Joel Dean, Capital Budgeting: Top-Management Policy on Plant, Equipment, and Product 
Development (New York : Columbia University Press,  1 9 5 1 ), pp. 53-54. 
48 Horngren, Cost Accounting, p .  497. "Net present value" is one of several discounted cash 
flow techniques which will  be discussed in section III. See below, p .  100. 
49 The 95 % confidence limits for the proportion of the population imposing this form of 
capital rationing are 43 % and 57 %.  
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The companies experien cing this class of capital rationing were asked the follow­
ing question, designed to narrow down the form in which this rationing was imposed . 
10.  If the answer to question 9 was " Yes" or " Sometimes," are funds limited in 
the case of: 
(1) Expansionary proposals Company-wide (e.g. buying a new factory) ? 
(2) Replacement proposals Company-wide ? 
(3) Expansionary proposals in a segment of the Company ? 
(4) Replacement proposals in a segment of the Company ? 
The data obtained from this question are analysed in the following table. 
TABLE 8 
Internal capital rationing imposed on certain classes of investment 
No . of companies 
% of companies to 
tot al sample 
of companies to 
se limiting funds 
pecific ways 
% 
tho 
in s 
of companies to 
se suffering 
rna! rationing 
% 
tho 
inte 
Company-wide 
Expansionary Replacement 
proposals proposals 
41  16  
23 .8 % 9.3 % 
47.6 % 1 8 .6 % 
28.4 % 1 1 . 1 % 
Restricted in one segment 
Expansionary Replacement 
proposals p roposals 
44 1 3  
25 .6 % 7. 5 % 
5 1 .2 % 1 5 .0 % 
30.5 % 9.0 %  
It seems that several companies limiting funds in specific areas or for specific 
tasks do so for expansionary proposals .  However, very few firms limit funds for 
replacement projects. Restrictions of funds to segments of the firm seem to be slightly 
more prevalent than limitations imposed company-wide. However, this difference i s  
probably not statistically significant. I t  might b e  concluded that many companies 
restricting funds in specific areas, or for specific kinds of investment, do so in a manner 
different from that presented here. The survey did not ascertain how these other 
restrictions are imposed. 
Internal capital rationing may be imposed in one year only, and thereafter all 
restrictions on capital expenditures are lifted. Where the goal of the firm is to maxi­
mize profits, internal rationing should be adopted only as a matter of expediency so 
that essential current payments can be maintained, or because large volumes of funds 
will be needed for expenditures in future years, and plans might be nullified if too 
many resources are committed to current proj ects . The company may also be entering 
into a "period of impending change in management personnel, when the status quo is 
maintained", 50  and temporary constraints are placed on capital expenditures . To the 
extent that capital rationing is imposed for these reasons , its existence is jus tified. 
50 Horngren, Cost Accounting, p. 498 .  
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However, internal capital rationing can be imposed over several periods of time 
also, and in this form it must be condemned, where profit maximization is the goal of 
the firm. 
There is no conceptual justification for such a budget ceiling. All projects that 
enhance long-run profitability should be accepted. This is the only decision rule 
that makes economic sense. To the extent that capital rationing exists , it should 
be a "short-run phenomenon, limiting expenditures only to the current year or 
two." 51 
Internal capital rationing causes some profitable proposals to be foregone, 
because it results from choosing funds for capital proj ects before an analysis is under­
taken of the acceptability of all projects.  To do this is "to put the cart before the 
horse". s a  Projects should be subjected to capital expenditure analysis first, then the 
necessary funds should be determined, and the firm's  prosperity will be enhanced by 
engaging in all acceptable proposals .  
Internal capital rationing arises where the profit maximization goal has been 
relaxed within the firm. This relaxation results from the degree of competence and 
financial sophistication in management, and its aversion to all forms of risk. 
Firstly, consider one of the methods for inflicting internal capital rationing on a 
firm ; that of segregation from, or limited access to, the capital market. Need for this 
arises because in many cases management lacks the skill to undertake all proj ects 
deemed desirable simultaneously. Rather than obtain the necessary experienced 
personnel externally, management shelves a proj ect. 
The need for capital rationing may also arise where there is no effective funds 
constraint, but where the rate of growth must be restrained because of managerial 
"indigestion, "  or shortages of skilled personnel or critical materials. 5 3  
Secondly, management may displ ay financial sophistication i n  not wanting t o  
obtain funds externally, through the medium o f  a new share i ssue, for fear o f  diluting 
the equity of the existing shareholders .  
Thirdly, abstention from the capital market can be caused by a desire of manage­
ment to avoid the perils that this can involve. These include the risk of liquidation 
because of unfavourable future events, and the burden thrown on the company by 
the presence of debt in the capital structure. Management fears not only for the safety 
of the firm, but also for its own security, since this is in jeopardy if liquidation is a 
possibility in the future. 
Debt financing puts an asymmetrical risk on management. The men who make 
the decisions rarely regard the profit propects as adequate to offset the threat to 
their personal security from general reorganization in bankruptcy. In many 
corporations ,  management's share in the profits of successful ventures (in the form 
of dividends on the stock th ey own) is an insignificant source of income compared 
with their salaries, which show admirable stability over the business cycle. 54 
Even where financial disaster is unlikely, borrowing may be kept to a minimum 
because management fears the restrictions lenders may place on the firm in return for 
their money. Management could desire to maintain a reserve of borrowing power for 
use when an unexpectedly profitable proposal is discovered, or to use in emergencies . 
51 Ibid. , p. 497, quoting H. Martin Weingartner, "The Excess Present Value Index-A Theoret­
ical Basis and Critique", Journal of Accounting Research 1 (Autumn 1 963) : 214. 
52 Lawson, " Capital Investment Criteria in Business-11", 492. 
53 G. David Quirin, The Capital Expenditure Decision (Homewood, Illinois : Richard D. Irwin, 
1 967), p. 1 76. That this state of affairs is very real in some organizations is argued in F. K [enneth] 
Wright, "Project Evaluation and the Managerial Limit",  Journal of Business 37 (April 1 964) : 1 79-85. 
54 Dean, Managerial Economics, p. 58L 
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On the other hand, where the company is effectivel y controlled by management, a 
fear may exist that this  grip on control could be shaken. "There is a limit, therefore, to 
the amount of stock [management] can sell in the market and the amount of funds 
[they J can raise by selling stoc k without risking the loss of control" .  55 
Fourthly, management may be trying to avoid upsets to normal methods of 
business. It is content to earn a satisfactory profit "considering safety and control to 
be more important than additional profits" .  56 In addition, utilization of all profitable 
opportunities might entail too much effort, and management would prefer an easy 
life, so it contents itself with a limited capital budget . 
Summary 
Internal capital rationing is by far the most prevalent form of capital rationing 
among li sted Australian public companies, being suffered by 83 .7 % of the total 
sample taken, and 95.3 % of those companies experiencing capital rationing in all 
forms. It may be imposed either by restricting funds for proj ects to retained earnings, 
a proportion of retained earnings, by setting a high cut-off rate for project accept­
ability, or by restricting capital expenditures in certain areas of the firm. 
Where the goal of the firm is to maximize profits , internal capital rationing is 
defensible if imposed as a matter of expediency in the short run. However, when this 
capital restricti on is  allowed to sti11e acceptable projects over several years, the 
maximization goal is not achieved. In this situation, internal capital rationing should 
be discontinued. 
Sum mary and concl u s i o n s  
I n  this section i t  has been argued that a capital rationing situation is one in 
which the firm either cannot or does not wish to raise sufficient funds for all capital 
expenditure proposals deemed profitable. From a survey of listed Australian public 
companies carried out by the writer, it was found that capital rationing is experienced 
by a maj ority of these companies .  The percentage of companies in the sample experi­
encing capital rationing was 87.2 % and the 95 % confidence limits for the percentage 
of all listed Australian public companies suffering from capital rationing were com­
puted to be 8 1 . 8 % and 9 1 .2 %. 
Capital may be rationed in two ways .  Firstly, the firm may experience external 
capital rationing where the funds available to the firm are limited by the capital 
market. This form of capital rationing affected 39.5 % of the sample . Secondly, the firm 
may suffer from internal rationing where funds for capital expenditures are limited by 
management. This was found to be the most prevalent form of rationing, being 
experienced by 83 .7 % of the sample. 
Therefore, the predominance of capital rationing among listed Australian public 
companies will be taken as established, and it seems than an examination of cut-off 
rates under these conditi ons is warranted. There is a need for a discussion of possible 
modifications to cut-off rates determined under the assumption of unlimited funds. 
This discussion i s  given i n  the remainder of thi s  study. 
�-----
· - - - · -·---·-----� - ----
55 Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition, p. 197. 
56 J.  Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Managerial Finance, 2nd ed. (New York : Holt , 
Rinehart and Winston, 1 966) , p, 1 62.  
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I ntrod uction 
In the previous section, a conclusion was reached that an investigation of cut-off 
rates under capital rationing seems desirable. This discussion will be commenced by 
briefly explaining some discounted cash flow techniques under the assumption of 
unlimited funds, and the importance of the cut-off rate in using these techniques . 
Observing the nature of this cut-off rate provides a good introduction to the discussion 
of its behaviour when a capital restriction is imposed. 
Disco unted cas h  flow techniq ues 
It was stated in section J5i that discounted cash flow methods of capital expen­
diture analysis are superior to any others, because they take into account the time 
value of money. Simply stated, the time value of money means that a dollar today is  
worth more than a dollar to be received at some time in the future. This dollar in 
hand now can be invested to return more than a dollar in years to come. Therefore, in 
any investment decision, the timing of cash flows plays an important part in deter­
mining project acceptability. 
Current and future dollars may be compared by reducing future dollars to present 
values . 
Expected future cash flows are discounted to present value by a discount rate ; 
the present value of cash inflows is then compared with the present value of cash 
outflows. This procedure allows the firm to decide whether to accept or rej ect 
the investment proposals under consideration. 58 
However, there are several discounted cash flow criteria available which can be 
used t o  obtain these present values . The most important of these are three in number. 
Net present value 
With the net present value criterion, all cash benefits and outflows associated with 
a project are discounted to a common point in time (usually the current period), at a 
predetermined discount rate in each period. The assumption is usually made that 
this rate of discount is constant over the life of the project. Net present value is 
obtained by subtracting the present value of cash outflows from the present value of 
cash benefits to arrive at one figure representing absolute investment worth. If a 
project has a positive net present value and is accepted, an immediate increase in the 
future wealth of the firm results . 
Mathematically, the net present value of an investment proposal is : [ sl S2 S n J Net present value = T+T + (1 + i)2 + · · · + (I-+ i)n. [Co + -I � i + . .  . + (f" �ni)n J 
wh.ere Co, C1, . . . . . .  , Cn are year-end cash outflows in periods 0, 1 , 2, . . . . . .  , n ;  S1, S 2, . . . . .  , 
Sn are year-end cash benefits in periods 1 ,  2, . . . . . .  , n. ; and i is the appropriate constant 
discount rate. 
57 See above, p. 80. 
58 Van Horne, Financial Management and Policy, p. 17.  
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Present value index 
This criterion of investment worth is computed by dividing the present value of 
future net cash flows from a project by its initial outlay.  59 Mathematically 
Present value index == S1 - C1 + S 2 - C2 -!- + S n  -- C n  
1 + i (T--+1)2 0-tl)li" 
Co 
--
where S1,  S2 ,  . . . . . .  , S n ;  Co , C1, . . . . . .  , Cn and i are defined as before. 
The present value index gives an absolute figure as a measure of investment 
worth, representing the present value of net cash flows per dollar of initial outlay. 
The internal rate of return 
This is the discount rate which equates the present value of cash outlays and the 
present value of cash benefits for an investment. In other words, it is the rate of dis­
count that reduces the net present value of the proposal to zero . Mathematically, the 
internal rate of return is represented by the discount rate r in the following equation : 
Co + r�\ + + (T �11r)n - 1 � r + (T-fr)a + . . . . . . + (f--�}1r)11 
where S1, S2 ,  . . . . . .  , S n, and Co, C1, . . . . . . , C n are defined as before. 
The internal rate of return expresses a proposal' s expected profitability as a 
single "rate of return per year" on the capital outstanding per peri od while it is still 
invested in the proposal. 60 
The cut-off rate 
It is no use determining the net present value, present value index, or Internal 
rate of retum for a proposal if the firm does not know how to use these criteria in 
ascertaining that proposal' s acceptability. To decide whether the firm will undertake 
an investment or not, acceptance rules must be establi shed with each of these three 
criteria. The appropriate acceptance rules have been summarized by Prest and 
Turvey : 
59 There appears to be some controversy about whether this is the correct definition of the 
present value index. Some writers define it as the present value of cash benefits divided by the present 
value of cash outflows. That is ,  
Present value sl 
-�---
_§_n�-
-l+i + (l + i) 2 + . . .  + (1 + i)l1 
C�- �c;-· · C11 
��T + . . . + {1-ti)ll 
However, cash outlays on a project subsequent to its acceptance are likely to be financed by the cash 
inflows from the project itself. A firm under capital r ationing is likely to be more interested in actual 
cash outflows from the firm in the form of initial outlays . Since the definition of present val ue index 
stated in the text places more emphasis on the initial outlay of a project than it does on the subsequent 
cash flows, it is preferred to the alternative definition. For a further discussion see Bernhard Schwab 
and Peter Lusztig, "A Comparative Analysis of the Net Present Value and the Benefit-Cost Ratio 
as Measures of the Economic Desirabil ity of Investments",  Journal of Finance 24 (June 1969) : 
507-5 1 6. 
60 The internal rate of return may also be interpreted as a constant rate of return per year on 
capital originally invested in the proposal . This interpretation implicitly assumes that the cash 
benefits from the proposal can be reinvested in the firm at this same internal rate of return. 
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1 .  Select all projects where the present value of benefits exceeds the present value 
of costs [that _is, where the net present value is positive] ; 
2 .  Select all projects where the [present value index] exceeds unity ; 
4. Select all proposals where the internal rate of return exceeds the chosen rate of 
discount. 61 
In each of these acceptance rules,  reliance is placed on the "chosen rate of dis­
count",  whether in reducing the future cash flows to present values in computing the 
net present value and present value index, or in comparisons with the internal rate of 
return. This rate of discount is the cut-off rate. As stated in section 1 ,611 the cut-off 
rate is  of great importance in capital expenditure analysis because it is a necessary 
factor in determining the point where management should cease spending funds on 
capital projects .  
Where all competing investment proposals in a given year are divisible and known 
in advance, together with the costs of raising sufficient funds to finance them, ob­
taining the correct cut-off rate is a relatively simple matter. It is determined by the 
point at which the profitability of projects falls to the l evel of the cost of funds . This 
is illustrated in figure 2 .  
D 
s 
0 
0 A mount o f  F i nan ce  
Fig. 2.-Cut-off rate under conditions of unlimited funds 
The SS curve represents the cost of funds needed to finance proposals .  This curve 
rises as m ore and more funds are raised, reflecting the fact that the firm is unable to 
61 A. R. Prest and R[alph] Turvey, "Cost-Benefit Analysis : A Survey", Economic Journal 15 
(December 1965) : 703. 
62 See above, p. 79 . 
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obtain funds at a constant cost of capital . The cost of raising these funds is then 
compared with the profitabilities of competing proposals, the latter being shown in 
figure 2 by the DD curve. In order to equate the profitability of investments and. the 
cost of funds for the investments, it is necessary to express profitability in terms of 
percentage rate of return. Therefore, the DD curve shows projects ranked in des­
cending order, by their internal rates of return. 
The intersection of the DD and SS curves at A determines the cut-off rate. At 
A, OX1 funds would be invested in capital investments, and for each project the 
internal rate of return exceeds the cost of funds .  To invest in projects beyond. X1 
would contradict the profitability goal of the firm, because funds would then cost 
more than the return they provide. Therefore, OY 1 is the cut-off rate for a firm faced 
with these investment and financing opportunities. 
By comparing OY1 with the internal rate of return of a proposal it is immediately 
apparent whether this proposal is profitable. Project C is acceptable because its 
internal rate of return, OB,  exceeds OY1• However, is OY1 the correct cut-off rate 
when using the net present value criterion ? The answer has been provided. in the 
following words : 
These two approaches [internal rate of return and net present value] give the 
same results for "accept or reject" decisions . This is so because the computed 
[internal rate of return] on a project will be higher than the cost of capital in all 
cases for which the present value of earnings discounted at the cost of capital is 
greater than the present value of outlays.63 
Therefore OY1 is the correct cut-off rate to use with net present value.  Since the 
present value index uses the same discount rate as the net present value, OY1 is also 
the correct cut-off rate for that criterion. 
This universality of the cut-off rate OY1 can be shown by considering figure 3 .  
Part A of figure 3 shows the relationship between the discount rate displayed on the 
x-axis, and the net present value of a particular proposal drawn as the curve NPV. 
Part B of the figure shows the relationship between the discount rate drawn on the 
x-axis, and the present value index of this same proposal displayed as the curve PVI .  
At the point R in part A ,  the net present value of  the proposal i s  zero and OR is 
the proposal ' s  internal rate of return, since this is the point at which the present value 
of its benefits equals tl1e present value of its costs , and their algebraic sum is zero.  64 
Similarly, at point R' in part B, the present value of future net cash flows equals the 
initial outlay on the project and the present value index is unity. R' is the internal rate 
of return also . 
For discount rates less than R in part A, the net present value exceeds zero 
signifying project acceptance. Similarly, in part B, for discount rates less than R', the 
present value index exceeds unity, also signifying project acceptance . In both cases 
the discount rate is less than the internal rate of return, and. this too indicates accept­
ability of the proposal. 
If the cut-off rate determined in figure 265  is shown as Y1 and Y1' in figure 3, the 
particular proposal shown in figure 3 will be accepted if either of the three investment 
criteria are used. Therefore, this cut-off rate is valid for use with all three of these 
criteria. 
63 Ezra Solomon, "The Arithmetic of Capital-Budgeting Decisions", Journal of Business 29 
(Apri1 1956) : 124-25. 
64 This was stated earlier. See above, p. 101. 
65 See above, p. l02. 
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The predetermined cut-off rate 
In most firms, there exists a need for a c ut-off rate which is predetermined by 
management before projects and the means of financing them are evaluated. This need 
arises for two reasons . Firstly, the demand schedule for capital, assumed to be known 
in figure 2, cannot be accurately forecast. 
It should by now be readily apparent that there is a need for some minimum 
standard or cut-off rate of return in using discounted cash flow evaluations . . .  
Not all of the investment opportunities which will be available in a forthcoming 
period are known in advance. Rather, many opportunities come about unexpec­
tedly, and one at a time. Thus,  the question is often limited to rej ection or 
acceptance of one project at a time. 66 
Secondly, the cost of funds curve, also assumed to be known in figure 2, defies accurate 
forecasting. A pred etermined cut-off rate is essential if proj ects are to be correctly 
evaluated in these circumstances . The value of this predetermined rate should be the 
same as the cut-off rate determined when all projects and funds available are known in 
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Fig. 3.-Relationship between the cut-off rate and the internal rate of return, net present value and 
present value index 
66 Edwin A. Bowen," Problem Areas in the Use of Discounted Cash Flow for Investment Evalu· 
ations", NAA Bulletin 44 (August 1 963) : 1 8 .  
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advance. However, "in practice the exact point where it occurs is very hazy and 
difficult to determine" .  67 Approximations often have to be used to arrive at practical 
measures of this cut-off rate. 
" Co nventional analysis, of c ut-off rates und e r  capital rati oning 
In a common treatment68 of the cut-off rate under conditions of capital rationing, 
to be referred to here as the "conventional analysis" , a diagram similar to figure 4 is 
drawn. Competing proposals are ranked in order of descending internal rates of  
return as shown by the DD curve. The S S  curve shows the increasing cost of  funds 
necessary to finance these proposals. Therefore, this diagram is similar to figure 2, 
shown previously.69  Wh ere funds are unlimited, the firm could profitably engage in 
projects up to the point X1 and the appropriate cut-off rate would be OY1 • However, 
a funds restriction is imposed and is shown on the diagram by a vertical line X2L, 
cutting the DD curve at L. This restriction only permits OX 2 to be spent on capital 
projects ,  and it is evident that projects X�1, although profitable, cann ot be under­
taken. To utilize these available funds in the most profitable manner, a firm should 
accept proposals along the DD curve up to the point L. The appropriate cut-off rate 
under this "conventional analysis" then becomes the internal rate of return on the 
project just rejected because of the funds constraint. This is represented by OY 2 on 
the y-'axis . 
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L 
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Fig. 4.-"Conventional analysis" of cut-otT rates under capital rationing 
67 Ibid. 
68 See Meredith, Capital Rationing, pp. 90-97, Merrett and Sykes, The Finance and Analysis of 
Capital Projects, pp . 1 39-42, and Weston and Brigham, Managerial Finance, pp. 1 77-78. 
69 See above, p. 102. 
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Criticisms of "conventional analysis" 
Despite the compelling simplicity of the "conventional analysis" , there are three 
factors which may cause the cut-off rate it determines to fail in the role of a universal 
cut-off rate under capital rationing. 
Inadequacies of the internal rate of ret urn as a ranking criterion 
Although the internal rate of return is beset by many difficulties,  70 those of most 
interest under capital rationing are : 
1 .  The possibility that a proposal has two or more internal rates of return. This 
can be caused by net cash outflows occurring in a proposal's pattern of cash flows 
during various periods after its acceptance. Where this occurs, it is not immediately 
apparent how this project should be ranked. 
2. Projects ranked in the demand curve may have varying u seful lives. To rank 
two projects with differing lives properly, some assumption must be made regarding 
the reinvestment of cash flows from the shorter project over the difference in their 
l ives. 71 This is not handled effectively by the internal rate of return. 
3. Use of the internal rate of return to rank proposals assumes that the standard 
of comparison, the cut-off rate, does not fluctuate over the life of the proposal. It will 
be demonstrated in section IV that the presence of capital rationing is quite likely to 
cause future fluctuations in the cut-off rate which consequently the internal rate of 
return cannot handle. 
Imp licit assump tion regarding the volume of available funds 
The "conventional analysis" of capital rationing assumes that the firm has 
predetermined those volumes of available investment funds and funds for dividend 
and non-investment payments which will maximize the appropriate goal of the firm. 
It will be demonstrated in this section that the goal of the firm plays an important 
part in determining the volume of funds available for investment, and in determining 
the cut-off rate. 
Multi-period investments and the frequency of cap ital rationing 
When analysing investment proposals with useful lives of several years, or 
"multi-period" investments, the "conventional analysis" takes no acco unt of the 
frequency of cap ital rationing. Fund restrictions may be imposed on the firm in the 
current period only, or over several periods, and it would be useful to know how pos­
sible alterations in this frequency of rationing affect the cut-off rate. The profitability 
of an investment proposal having a long useful life could depend on the value of this 
cut-off rate. If, for example, it fluctuates in future periods when capital rationing is 
imposed, the net present value or present value index of the proposal will be affected 
because this future cut-off rate is used to discount future cash flows to their present 
valu es. 
A substitute for the "conventional analysis" 
To examine how these foregoing factors may be taken into account when ana­
lysing projects under capital rationing, it is proposed to develop an argument in two 
parts. The first deals with "two-period" investments. These are proposals which 
require an investment in period one, and are completely disinvested in period two .  
Consideration o f  this kind o f  investment allows a concentration o n  the second 
-· ------·-- ----
70 Elaboration of all the alleged inadequacies of the internal rate of return is outside the scope of 
this study. However, interested readers may :.:efer to Van Horne, Financial Management and Policy, 
pp . 36-41 , and J[ack] Hirshleifer, "On the Theory of Optimal Investment Decision", Journal of 
Political Economy 66 (August 1 958) : 345-52. 
71 This was first pointed out in Solomon, "The Arithmetic of Capital Budgeting Decisions" . 
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inadequacy of the "conventional analysis " , mentioned above . 7 2  This was the possibil ity 
that different goals of the firm could cause differing volumes of investment funds to 
be made available and different cu t-off rates to apply.  A two-peri od proj ect automat­
ically avoids the possibility of differing frequencies of capital rationing, since capital 
is  rationed in one period only . 
Many of the inadequacies of the internal rate of return are overcome als o .  
Specificall y, as each project consists of an initial outlay and one cash return, there i s  
n o  possibility of multiple  internal rates of return ; and a s  all proj ects automatically 
have the same useful lives, there is no problem with equating useful l ives to obtain 
meaningful internal rates of return.  
It is assumed that all  proj ects competing for available funds are divisible so i t  
would be possible to draw a smo oth demand curve for capital similar to the DD curve 
in figure 2 . 7 3  This assumpti on will be maintained in the rest of this section and in 
section IV, since it greatly simplifies the argument to be presented. 
The second stage of the argument, to be outlined in section IV, deals with "multi­
period" investments . This allows discussi on of the frequency of capital rationing 
and its effect on the cut-off rate . 
Two- p e r i o d  i nvest m ents u n d e r  cap i tal  rat i o n i ng 
The goal of the firm 
Where funds have been l imited either by the capital market or by management, 
the appropriate investment obj ective has been stated in the following words : 
In the p resence of capital rationing one is no longer concerned with the selection 
o f  an ideal set of investments whose acqui sition might wel l require resources 
beyond those available to the firm. Rather, one must determine the best course 
which can be followed with the l imited funds on hand . 7 4  
However, this does not answer the questi on "The best c ourse for whom ?" If i t  is 
the best course to adopt for the benefit of the firm, then the objective becomes 
determining that set of investment proj ects which maximizes profits of the firm subj ect 
to the funds constraint. 
On the other hand, if the best course to adopt is for the benefit of the ordinary 
shareholders, then the o bj ective may not be to adopt a set of proposals which maxi­
mizes the profits of the firm. It should be to maximize the wealth of the ordinary 
shareholders. This consists of a subtle mix of increases in the market value of ordinary 
shares, and increases in dividend payments, without diluting ordinary shareholders' 
equity . 7 5  
It is assumed i n  thi s study that the market price o f  a share depends directly on the 
future dividends to be paid on it. This follows John B. Wi lliams' theory of investment 
value which states that an ordinary share is worth the sum of all expected future 
dividends d iscounted to the present.'6  Therefore, the weal th of the ordinary share­
holder, in theory at least, depends on the generation of current and future dividends. 
72 See above, p . 1 06 .  
73 See above, p.  1 02 .  
7 4  William J. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis, 2nd e d .  (Englewood Cli ffs, 
New Jersey : Prentice-Hal l, 1 965), p .  448 .  
75 For a further discuss ion o f  th is goal, see Van Horne, Financial Management and Policy, 
pp. 7-8, and James T. S. Por terfie ld , Investme/11 Decisions and Capital Costs (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1 965), pp. 1 1 -17 .  
76 See John B.  Williams, The Theory of Investment Value (Cambridge : Harvard Univen>ity 
Press, 1 938). 
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Ploughing all the firm's resources into capital projects implies that ordinary 
shareholders have an absolute preference for future dividends and are prepared to 
forego all current dividends to get them. On the other hand, paying out all resources 
as current dividends implies that these shareholders prefer current dividends to future 
dividends and are prepared even to liquidate the firm to get them. In many companies ,  
however, neither situation applies. Instead, ordinary shareholders desire current 
dividends but also want to see a proportion of the firm's resources ploughed back 
into investment projects, so that future dividend prospects are enhanced. 
Although investors have prized dividends, they have never expected. companies to 
pay out the full amount of their earnings. It is  considered sound corporate policy,  
and thus in the interests of the shareholders, to retain an appreciable part of an 
average year's  earnings for various protective and constructive purposes. 77  
At this point it shall be assumed that all  ordinary shareholders in a firm have the 
same expectations and desires regarding the stability of current and future dividends 
from their firm. They are in the same income stratum in society, are possessed of the 
same personality characteristics and are faced by the same set of consumption 
opportunities to which they can apply their dividends. Also, these dividend payments 
are their only source of income. In short, these ordinary shareholders belong to one 
homogeneous group in society. 78 
Bearing this assumption in mind, it is  further postulated that the question of 
current or future dividend payments to these shareh olders can be resolved by reference 
to a common schedule of time preference rates.  
Thus, it is  assumed that the [ordinary shareholders] have a schedule of time­
preference rates by means of which consumption opportunities are evaluated. 
One may conceive of this schedule as serving two purposes. First, it provides a 
means of comparing current consumption opportunities with each other and thus 
a means of allocating funds among specific increments of consumption. Second, 
it provides a means by which the [ordinary shareholders] may choose between 
consumption and investment opportunities, that is ,  between immediate and 
delayed consumption. [Their] objective in making . . .  financial decisions should 
be to consume, invest, and raise funds in such a way that [their] consumption 
over time will yield [them] the greatest wealth.79  
Since dividends are the only source of income to these ordinary shareholders,  
this schedule of time preference rates can be mapped as a set of indifference curves 
relating current dividends to future dividends. This is shown in figure 5 .  
Current dividends are drawn o n  the x-axis and future dividends are drawn o n  the 
y-axis.  For a firm concerned only with two period investments, the y-axis would 
become period one dividends, but thi s development is explored later.80 The curves 
u1, u 2, and u3 are just three of a family of curves that could be drawn on the diagram, 
but are not for the sake of simplicity. Each curve is the locus of points, representing 
combinations of current and future dividends between which the ordinary share­
holders are indifferent. Thus, ordinary shareholders would be indifferent if they had to 
choose between either a combination of X1 current dividends and Y1 future dividends, 
or a combination of X2 and Y 2 of the same dividend opportunities . 
If it is the aim of ordinary shareholders to maximize their wealth they would 
prefer to be on indifference curve u3 rather than u2 or u1, s ince all combinations on 
77 Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle, Security Analysis: Principles and 
Technique, 4th ed. (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962), p. 482. 
78 This rather bold assumption will be relaxed later. See below, p.  1 1 4. 
79 Porterfield, Investment Decisions and Capital Costs, p. 9.  
80 See below, p. l l O .  
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u 3  represent more dividends than any point on u2 or u1. ln striving to achieve the goal 
of wealth maximization for its ordinary shareholders, a firm should attain that 
combination of current and future dividends that puts these shareholders on the 
highest indifference curve possible, given the level of current resources available to the 
firm. By relating the allocation of funds for investment proposals to the question of 
current or future dividend payments, a frrm with rationed funds may achieve the goal 
of maximization of ordinary shareholders' wealth. 
Even where the goal of the fliiD is corporate profit maximization, the question of 
dividend payments arises where only limited funds are available, because a choice 
must be made between dividends and investment projects. A firm in this situation 
would try to pay as small a dividend as possible in the hope of utilizing all profitable 
investment projects. 
It could be concluded that the goal of the firm plays a vital part in capital expen­
diture analysis when funds are limited. This goal determines the appropriate amount 
of dividend payments made, and these in turn determine the volume of retained funds 
available for capital expenditures. 
F u t u r e  
D i v id e nd 
u 3  �---- U.e. 
�------- Ut  
C u r r ent  D i v i d e n d s  
Fig. S - Ordinary shareholders' indifference map relating current and future dividends 
A fallacy inherent in the "conventional analysis" 
In the "conventional analysis" of cut-off rates under capital rationing, there is an 
implicit assumption that the "correct" amount of dividends has been paid before 
funds available for capital expenditures are determined.. Although the goal that is 
being aimed at by advocates of the "conventional analysis" is sometimes stated, 81 
81 For example, the goal of shareholders' wealth maximization is stated by Merrett and Sykes , 
The Finance and Analysis of Capital Projects, p. 142. However, they fail to relate the dividend question 
to their analysis . 
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they fail to incorporate in their analyses the combination of dividend payments and 
investments necessary to maximize their particular goal .  
The following analysis82 incorporates the question o f  differing goals and the 
related question of dividend payments. 
Basic data for the two-period analysis 
Consider a firm that has available in period zero a fixed volume of funds which 
are to be used for dividend payments and capital investments . The limit on available 
funds may be either internally or externally imposed. 
This firm has a number of independent two-period investment projects available 
which can be arranged in order of profitability. Profitability is  defined as the internal 
rate of return on each proposal. Where an initial outlay Ko in period zero is  required 
for a return of K 1  in period one, the internal rate of return is  given by r in the equati on 
K, Ko = ( 1  + r) 
S olving for r, thi s equation becomes 
K1 - 1  r 
= Ko 
All availabl e internal two-period investments can be arranged in descending order of 
profitability to form what shall be called the productive opp ortunity curve for the firm. 
"It is  the locus of po ints attainable to [the firm] as [it] sacrifices more and more of Ko 
by productive investments yielding K1 in return."83 This productive opportunity curve 
is presented in figure 6 by the curve XYZB . 
The x-axis of figure 6 shows resources in period zero and OX is the limit of 
available funds. Income generated in period one by undertaking two-period invest­
ments is shown on the y-axis. 
The curve XYZB shows investment opportunities open to the firm with OX funds 
available in period zero. For instance, by investing all OX in two-period projects, 
the firm will accumulate OB funds in period one. 
Alternatively, by investing XE funds in proj ects, OE funds are available for 
period zero dividend payments, and OH funds are generated in period one . By 
committing XE of current funds to investments, the firm would accept all the projects 
represented by the segment XYF of the productive opportunity curve XYZB. The 
internal rate of return of the proj ect at any point on this segment is  given by the slope 
of the productive opportunity curve at that point. Thus,  by investing along this 
curve from X to F, the firm is accepting projects of strictly decreasing profitability 
since the curve is steepest at X and flattens out in proceeding through the point Y to F. 
By drawing the productive opportunity curve as a smooth curve, recognition is given 
to the assumption made earlier, that all proposals under consideration are divisible. 8 4  
The indifference curves u1 , u2, and u 3 are part of the assumed known schedule 
of time preference rates for current dividends as opposed to future dividends. In the 
case being considered here, future dividends would be period one dividends .  Once the 
two-period proposals have been disinvested, their receipts are assumed to be dis­
bursed to ordinary shareholders . In this way, assumptions about the future rein­
vestment of funds by the firm can be avoided. Aside from this  qualification, however, 
these indifference curves are the same as those shown in figure 5 . 8 5  
8 2  This analysis i s  based o n  Hirshleifer, "Optimal Investment Decision". 
83 Ibid. , 3 32. 
84 See above, p. 80. 
85 See above, p. 1 09. 
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Apart from the array of internal investment opportunities displayed by the curve 
XYZB in figure 6,  the firm has other two-period investment opportunities open to it. 
These consi st of investments in the best opportunity external to the firm. For instance, 
this opportunity could be an investment in government securities. By investing all 
peri od zero resources in this "next-best" opportunity, the firm would obtain OA in­
come in period one. The slope of line AX is the rate of return available from thi s 
investment. Similarly, OC is the peri od one return available from an investment, in 
thi s opportunity, of period zero resources well in excess of OX and not shown in 
figure 6.  The amount of these peri od zero resources is  given by the imagined intercept 
of the line CZ with the X"axis .  The slope of CZ equals the slope of AX because b oth 
investments have the same rate of return. 86 
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Fig 6. - Two-period investments under capital rationing 
The sl ope of these lines represents the cost of capital to the firm. There are no 
explicit costs of capital since the firm has no access to the capital market and so 
cannot raise funds by issuing shares or by b orrowing. This cost of capital shown is an 
oppo rtunity cost of using funds already in the firm. It is assumed to be constant 
during periods zero and one, an assumption represented by drawing AX and CZ as 
straight lines.  
86 There would be a family of lines parallel to AX, showing the outcomes of investing various 
amounts of period zero funds in this "next-best" opportunity. 
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With these facts about figure 6 discussed, an outline will be given of the correct 
cut-off rates under both the goals of corporate profit maximization and maximization 
of the wealth of th e ordinary shareholders .  
The cut-off rate under corporate profit maximization 
If the firm could relegate dividend payments to a secondary place, corporate 
profits would be maximized by selecting projects in figure 6, from X along the pro­
ductive opportunity curve to Z, the point of tangency between this curve and the cost 
of capital line CZ. Here the slope of XYZB becomes equal to the cost of capital, 
implying that the internal rate of retum of project Z equals the opportunity cost of 
capital. Investments in excess of Z along the segment ZB would have internal rates of 
retum less than the cost of capital and are unprofitable. If the firm could escape all 
dividend payments, OD not invested internally, would be invested in the "next-best" 
opportunity along CZ, and OC funds would be the total generated in period one . 
However, management of the firm may be obliged to pay dividends .  The share­
holders may threaten to change the management team unless dividends are paid , 
or management may fear a take-over bid for the firm if they pay no dividends. 
Suppose that the minimum dividend th at must be paid in period zero is  OE. This 
leaves XE available for investment. Since all proj ects from X to Z along the pro­
ductive opportunity curve have been deemed profitable, the firm should invest all 
remaining resources XE in them. Thus, proposal s X to F are undertaken. 
The appropriate cut-off rate in this case is the slope of the productive opportunity 
curve at the point F. It represents the internal rate of return of the proj ect j ust rej ected. 
This result would be similar to the cut-off rate determined under the "conventional 
analysis" if the only proj ects being considered in th at analy sis were two-period 
investments . 87 
The predetermined cut-off rate under corporate profit maximization 
In the foregoing analysis, it has been assumed that all proj ects competing for 
available funds are known in advance . However, as shown previously,88 where ad­
vance knowledge of all projects is not possible, a predetermined cut-off rate is required. 
To o btain this rate for two-period projects, it may be necessary to look at the marginal 
internal rate of retum on proposals just rejected in the past. However, for this to be 
a valid step, it must be assumed that the volume of funds available and the profit­
ability of investments in prior years resembled those in the current year. The obj ective 
is to approximate the current year situation depicted in figure 6, and defined by the 
volume of available funds OX as well as the profitability of available proj ects .  These 
two variables determine the shape and position of the productive opportunity curve 
XYZB. If the above conditions were present in previous years, the investment sit­
uati on then in existence could be depicted in a diagram similar to figure 6. Theoret­
ically, the predetermined cut-off rate would be the internal rate of retum of the proj ect 
just rejected in prior years.  However, where advance knowledge of the full array of 
available projects was not available in the past, the correct predetermined cut-off 
rate is the internal rate of retum of the proposal just accep ted in these years . Since, by 
assumption, all projects under consideration are divisible, the project j ust accepted 
in the past would be only infinitesimally more profitable than the one just rej ected . 
Such a small difference is immaterial for practical purposes . 
Where di scounted cash flow methods were not used previously, no such marginal 
internal rate of return is available immediately. Nevertheless,  this required rate may be 
obtained in the following manner : 
87 See above, p. 105 .  
8 8  See above, p.  104. 
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The internal rate o f  return o f  any two-period project,89 
K1 - 1,  where K1 = income in period 1 r =  Ko Ko = outlay in period zero 
Kl - KO 
Ko 
1 1 3 
However, K1 - Ko/Ko is the accounting rate of return for this proj ect . Therefore, 
the required marginal internal rate of return on the proj ect just accepted in prior 
years is  obtained by using the accounting rate of return on this prior period project . 
The cut-off rate under maximization of the ordinary shareholders'wealth 
Where the goal of the firm becomes maximizing the wealth of its ordinary 
shareholders, the cut-off rates computed in the previous section are not correct. 
Ordinary shareholders' wealth is maximized by selecting that combinati on of dividends 
and investments in period zero whi ch puts these shareholders on the highest possible 
indifference cu rve shown in figure 6.  The highest such curve attainable i s  u2 which is a 
tangent to the productive opportunity curve XYZB at the point Y. Projects are 
accepted up to the point Y and the quantity of period zero funds invested is XG. The 
remainder GO is distributed as cu rrent dividends .  Ordinary shareholders obtain YG 
as dividends in period one. 
That investment in projects up to the point Y results in maximum wealth accru­
ing to the ordinary shareholders can be seen by considering any other point on the 
productive opportunity curve XYZB, such as the point J. The highest indifference 
curve attained there is u1 , which is less than indifference curve u 2 •  Since u2 is tangent 
to the XYZB curve it is the highest indifference curve attainable. 
The appropriate cut-off rate in this case is the internal rate of return of the project 
just rej ected, and is represented by the slope of the XYZB curve at the p o int Y . 
.; 
The predetermined cut�off rate under maximization of ordinary 
shareholders ' wealth 
Although the foregoing theoretical result may seem straightforward, actual 
derivation of the slope of the productive opportunity curve at Y is extremely difficult . 
There are two reasons why this is so.  
Interdependency between the c ut-off rate and the shape of the productive 
opportunity c urve 
A fundamental weakness exists in the previous theory which prompts the search 
for a substitute cut-off rate. It simply amounts to saying that the firm does not know 
the shape of its productive opportunity curve in advance. Therefore some predeter­
mined cut-off rate is required. 90 However, there is more to the matter than this . 
Hirshleifer has described the situation in the following terms : 
The discount rate to be used for calcul ating present values or as a standard of 
comparison against the internal rate of project increments is the rate given by the 
slope of the . . .  tangency (the marginal Internal Rate of Return) ; with this rate, 
the rules give the correct answer. But this rate cannot be discovered until the 
solution is attained and so is of no assistance in reaching the solution.91 
Baumol and Quandt also explain this weakness : 
The trouble simply is that in the circumstances under consideration we cannot 
determine a discount rate until we can calculate a marginal profit opportunity 
89 See above, p. l lO. 
90 This weakness is evident also where maximization of corporate profits is the assumed goal 
of the firm. It was dismissed previously by saying that the shape of the productive opportunity curve 
is not known in advance and a predetermined cut-off rate is needed. 
91 Hirshleifer, "Optimal Investment Decision", p. 3 34. 
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cost of postponement ; but we cannot calculate profit until we have obtained our 
discount rate. 9 2  
The underlying cause is the interdependency between the slope o f  the productive 
opportunity curve and the cut- off rate . For instance, knowledge that this rate is likely 
to be quite high since funds are very limited may influence management to put extra 
efforts into project generation so that the resulting array of proposals have very high 
profitability. On the other hand, if it is thought that the cut-off rate will be relatively 
low, there may be an air of indifference to the task of generating projects of high 
profitability. This interdependency between the cut-off rate and the shape of the 
productive opportunity curve causes the determination of one in isolation of the other 
to be a difficult task. 9 3  
Rather than wrestl e with tb.is probl em, Baumol and Quandt have suggested a n  
alternative approach. Although the accuracy o f  tb.is alternative i s  not abso lute, i t  i s  
the best available i n  the light o f  the difficulties involved i n  estimating the marginal 
internal rate of return required to select projects as a means of maximizing ordinary 
shareholders' wealth. The Baumol and Quandt solution has been summarized by 
Van Horne. 
They [Baumol and Quandt] suggest the use of a subjective discount rate, deter­
mined by the utility preferences of the entrepreneur . . .  9 4  
Management o f  the firm determines the appropriate cut-off rate under the 
B aumol and Quandt approach. It would be based on an assessment of the profitability 
of marginal projects in prior years tempered by subjective factors . These subjective 
factors include the attitude of management towards the risk inherent in the propo sals 
submitted, the state of the economy and the future prospects of the firm. A conserva­
tive management might require a higher cut-off rate than in previous years b ecause the 
flock of projects currently submitted for appraisal is more risky than projects in the 
past. Optimism on the part of management might cause them to lower the cut- off rate 
in the hope of reaping the extra profits they think are available "if only investments 
are made now" . 
The impossibility of obtaining a unique set of ordinary shareholders' 
indifference curves 
There is another weakness under lying the two-period analysis .  Where ordinary 
shareholders' wealth is to be maximized, a common schedule of time preference 
rates for these shareholders was used in deriving the correct cut-off rate. This schedule 
was represented by the indifference curves ul> u2 and u3 in figure 6, and to obtain them, 
complete homogeneity of all shareholders was assumed.95  However, such an a ssump­
tion is unrealistic. Shareholders typically belong to many heterogeneous grou ps with 
differing levels and sources of incomes, often contradic tory cultural backgrounds, and 
conflicting desires and aspirati ons about their firm. With such diversity, no unique 
set of indifference curves is possible. 
To overcome this difficulty, the subjective discount rate of management is again 
proposed. Its use will res ult in the maximization of ordinary shareholders' wealth 
where it is assumed that management has the best interests of these shareholders at 
heart. 
92 William J. Baumol and Richard E. Quandt, "Investment and Discount Rates Under Capital 
Rationing-A Programming Approach" , Economic Journal 75 (June 1 965) : 325. 
93 This argument is based on a line of reasoning u sed to explain the interdependency of the 
market rate of interest and the shape of the productive opportunity curve where no capital rationing 
exists. For further information see Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest: As Determined by Im­
patience to Spend Income and Opportunity to Invest It (New York : Macmillan Company, 1 930), 
p. 278, and Armen A. Alchian, "The Rate of Interest, Fisher's Rate of Return over Costs and Keynes' 
Internal Rate of Return", American Economic Review 45 (December 1955) : 942. 
94 Van Horne, Financial Management and Policy, n.  14, p. 44. 
95 See above, p .  1 08.  
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Summary and conclusions 
The discussion of the cut-off rate under capital rationing for a two-period 
investment is summarized in table 9. 
TABLE 9 
Summary of cut-otT rates for two-period investments 
Goal of firm 
Corporate profit maximization 
Maximizing ordinary 
shareholders' wealth 
Theoretical cut-off rate 
Marginal internal rate of 
return of project just re­
jected 
Internal rate of return of 
project at the point of tan­
gency between the indiffer­
ence curves of shareholders 
and the productive oppor­
tunity curve 
Predetermined cut-off rate 
Accounting rate of return 
of project just accepted in 
the past 
Management's subjective dis­
count rate 
The two-period analysis presented in this section implies that projects are selected 
on the basis of their internal rates of return, since the productive opportunity curve 
was devised by ranking proposals in descending order of their internal rates of return. 
Selection was made of all proposals whose internal rates of return exceeded the cut-off 
rate, by choosing proposals along the productive opportunity curve in figure 6,  until 
the cut-off point was reached. 
However, this analysis should not be taken as a negation of the use of criteria 
such as the net present value or present value index. By using as discount rates the 
cut-off rates appropriate under the goals of corporate profit maximization or ordinary 
shareholders' wealth maximization, both the net present value and present value index 
criteria will lead to selection of the sets of investments which achieve these goals .  
The analysis presented in this section was concerned with two-period investments 
and so would be of limited use to most firms. In practice, most investments that are 
undertaken last many years, during which the firm could experience capital rationing 
in periods of long or short duration. To cater for these cases, multi-period investments 
under capital rationing will be considered in section IV. 
I V .  T HE C UT- O FF RATE F O R  M U LT I-PERI O D  I N V E ST M E N TS 
U N DER CAP ITA L RAT I O NI N G :  T HE O RY A N D  PRACT I CE 
Introd uction 
Multi-period investments, or those investments with useful lives in excess of 
two-periods, raise special problems when they are to be evaluated under conditions 
of capital rationing. Perhaps the most important of these problems is the frequency of 
capital rationing and its effect on project acceptability . Sometimes capital restric­
tions exist only in the current period, and thereafter all rationing is lifted, and every 
profitable investment may be utilized. This situation will be called "single-period 
rationing" . On the other hand, funds retrictions may be enforced over several capital 
budgeting periods, perhaps even as long as the lives of all proposals being considered 
currently. Such a situation will be called "multi-period rationing" . As each form of 
capital rationing involves different sets of cut-off rates, multi-period investments will 
be analysed in two sections here : the first dealing with "single-period rationing" , and 
the second dealing with "multi-period rationing" . 
Since multi-period investments are likely to be the most common variety of 
capital expenditure found in practice, it would be interesting to discover the answers to  
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these questions : Are the cut-off rates devised in this section b eing utilized by business­
men ? If they are not, what procedures do businessmen use to adjust for capital 
rationing ? To answer these questions, some empirical evidence will be presented from 
the survey of listed Australian public companies performed by the writer. This 
evidence gives a guide to the current state of practice in this area. 
S i n g l e- p e r i o d  rat i o n i n g  
Where the firm imposes a restriction on the funds available i n  the current period, 
and none thereafter, the appropriate cut-off rate for evaluating future projects 
returns to the "normal " rate applicable when fu nds are unlimited. If the goal of the 
firm is maximization of ordinary shareholders' wealth, this "normal" cut-off rate is 
the firm's  cost of capital . 
We first referred to cost of capital as a "hurdle rate" or "cut-off rate" to be used 
when evaluating proposed capital expenditures by the rate-of-return approach. 
Thus if a project offers a rate of return greater than the cost of capital, it is 
worthwhile from a monetary standpoint. If the cost of capital exceeds the 
expected rate of return, the residual owners would. be worse off financially if the 
project were und ertaken. Altematively, cost of capital serves as the discount 
rate in the net present value approach. 96 
In addition, if the goal is corporate profit maximization, the appropriate cut-off rate is 
again the cost of capital. A firm should not invest in proposals with profitabilities 
less than the costs of funds necessary to finance them. 
However, actual computations of the cost of capital under each of these goal s 
are likely to be different, simply because each goal is different. 
Determining cost of capital is an extremely complex problem, the dimensions of 
which can only be suggested here. Since capital budgeting, by definition, involves 
choosing future courses of action, it is a future cost of capital which is needed. 
But some value judgments concerning management's conception of the firm's 
principal objective(s) must be made initially to establish a viewpoint from which 
this cost can be measured. One might, for example, measure cost of capital 
differently if management' s  primary goal were viewed as maximization of 
corporate net worth than if maximization of returns to shareholders were con­
sidered management's prime objective. (Especially is such a divergence in measures 
possible with respect to the cost of equity capital .)97 
The theoretical computation of costs of capital under each of these goals will not be 
discussed further,98 but it should be remembered that when reference is  made sub­
sequently to the costs of capital under these goals, the two costs of capital are un­
likely to be the same. 
If the firm can compute its cost of capital in all future periods, then the only 
problem remaining is to determine the appropriate cut-off rate for the current period. 
From the previous discussion of two-period investments,99 it is likely that this rate 
will differ from the cost of capital. 
Derivation of the current period cut-off rate 
Whilst the nature of current investments plays a part in determining the volume 
of internally generated funds available in the future, it can be safely assumed that 
where only single-period capital rationing is imposed, this volume of funds does not 
96 Johnson, Financial Management, p. 275. The rate of return referred to by Jolmson is the 
internal rate of return of the project. 
97 Victor H. Brown, "Rate of Return : Some Comments on its Appl icability in Capital Bud­
geting", Accounting Review 36 (January 1 961) : 55. 
98 However, interested readers could refer to Van Home, Financial Management and Policy, 
pp. 1 09-1 39.  
99 See above, p .  1 1 5 .  
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restrict future dividend payments and future investment decisions. If the pattern of 
future cash flows from investments is such that the firm expects to find itself short 
of internal resources in a future period, then it may obtain additional funds from the 
capital market to supplement those internally generated.100  As a result, dividend 
payments may be maintained and the firm can engage in all profitable capital expen­
diture proposals in that period. 
Because of this ready access to the capital market in the future, there is no need 
to adjust the capital expenditure analysis of current investment projects to ensure 
that those selected now will generate large cash benefits in that future period to in­
crease the interna1 funds of the firm. Therefore if two investment projects have the 
same useful lives, but one has an irregular pattern of cash flows and the other has a 
constant annual cash flow, they will be equally desirable,  provided they b oth have the 
same internal rate of return. 
If the firm had available a selection of independent, divisible investments all with 
infinite lives and irregular patterns of cash inflows, it would be possible to stipulate for 
each prop osal, a perpetuity101 with an identical initial outlay and the same internal 
rate of return. The firm would be indifferent between this perpetuity and the original 
proposal. 
By considering all infinite proposals in terms of their perpetuity equivalents, it is 
possible to l ook upon the activities of the firm as occurring in two periods . Firstly, 
there is the current period, or period zero, in which the competing investments are 
analysed and those selected are undertaken. Secondly, all periods after the current 
period may be regarded as one long "future" peri od, stretching from period one to 
infinity . Investments in period zero then return a con stant amount at regular intervals 
forever during this future period. Therefore, this assumes that everything concerning 
the welfare of the firm continues unchanged forever after period zero . Looked at in 
this l ight, all projects of infinite life can be treated as two-period investments and the 
cut-off rate in period zero is derived in a similar fashion to the cut-off rate for 
two-period investments derived in section III . 
However, in reality most proj ects have definitely limited lives102 and there i s  no 
justification for finding perpetuities with identical internal rates of return to these 
finite proposals. The life of the fi rm itself is open to question beyond more than several 
decades, since the planning activities of the firm become very inaccurate for periods 
far into the future, and the cash flows from projects with very long lives become 
100 It is assumed that the cost of capital in future years remains relatively stable. 
101 A perpetuity is defined as a project with an initial out lay C0, and a constant annual return 
S,  forever. The internal rate of return for this perpetuity is  the rate r in the equation: 
s s s 
c. = -- + + . . .  + -------- (1 ) 
1 -/- r ( 1  -/- r)2 (1 -/- r) n 
s s 
( 1 -/- r)C0 = S -/- -- -/- . . .  -/- (2) 
1 -/- r ( 1 -1- r)u-1 
Subtract ing (1 )  from (2) 
(1 + r) Co - C0 = S - S 
( l  + r)n 
s s 
r = - - - . ---
C0 C0 (1 -/- r)n 
1 
Where the life of the project is infinite, --- = zero 
s Therefore, r = Co 
( 1  + r)n 
1 02 A possible exception would be an investment in a block of land. 
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subjected to high degrees of uncertainty. Nevertheless,  where the firm does  plan ahead 
for a reasonable period into the future, say fifty years, it is possible to treat all projects 
as fifty-year investments generating constant annual cash flows, as will now be shown. 
Suppose that all the proposals submitted to the firm have lives ranging from three 
years up to fifty years. For meaningful analysis, it is necessary to compare these 
proposals over the economic life of the longest proj ect ; that is, over fifty years. 
Therefore, some assumption must be made regarding the reinvestment of cash flows 
from the short projects in the interim period. It will be assumed that necessary 
information about these reinvested cash flows is available .103 This means that each 
proposal can be represented as a fifty-year project whether its original life is fifty 
years or not. For instance, a proposal of ten years' economic life could be represented 
as follows : 
Expected cash flows S1, S 2, • • • , S1 0, Sw S12 ,  . . .  , S5 0, where 
S1, S 2, • • •  , S1 0 are net cash flows expected to 
be generated by the proposal ; and 
Sw S12 ,  . • •  , S5 0 are net cash flows 
expected to be generated by funds from this 
proposal, reinvested in the finn. 
If the firm's  cost of capital during all future periods is known, then this irregular 
series of cash flows may be converted into a series of constant annual cash flows over 
the fifty-year period. This is achieved by computing the period one present value of all 
future cash flows from the proposal ,  and then converting this into a constant annual 
sum. 
Present value in S S 
period one = sl + 1-+ 2[ + 
. . .  + (T_� oi) 50- ,  where 
S1, S 2, • • •  , S5 0 are the cash flows as before, 
and i is the cost of capital. 
Constant annual sum10 4 == Present value in period one 
1 + 1 + -1-- + . . . + 
r-+i cf+--i)2 (r + i) 50 
= S *  
Bearing this in mind, the firm's activities can then b e  regarded a s  being carried 
out in two periods. The first period is peri od zero in which single-peri od rationing 
exists, and in which the available fifty-year investment projects are evaluated. The 
second period is a "future" period, stretching from the close of the first period to the 
fifty-year planning horizon. Beyond this "future" period it may be assumed for 
103 This may be obtained from statistical projections of past eamings figures for the firm, or 
it may be based on management's budgeted profit figures during these periods . 
104 If the initial ou tlay of this proposal is C0, its internal rate of return r is given by the equation : 
S* S* S* 
c. =� ---- -1- --·- + . . . + 
1 + r (1 + r)2 (1 -1- r) 50 
Multiplying both si des by (l -1- r) 
S* S* 
(1 + r) C0 = S* + ---­
(1 + r) 
-1- . • •  + ----­
(1 + r)40 
By subtraction of the previous equation from this one 
S* 
(1 + r) C0 - Co = S* - --­
(1 + r)'" 
S*  
r C0 = S* -- --­
(1 -1- r) 50 
S* S* 1 
C0 - C0 (1 -1- r) 50 
C UT-O FF RATES U N DER CAPITAL RATION I N G  1 1 9 
practical purposes that the activities of the enterprise cease .  During this "future" 
period, the welfare of the firm does not change, it has ready access to the capital 
market at a constant or at most, a moderately rising cost of capital, and investments 
undertaken in period zero do not affect decisi ons to pay dividends or to undertake 
investments in the "future" period. 
Period zero projects can be considered in terms of their equivalents, fifty-year 
projects with constant annual returns . For each project, an outlay is made in period 
zero, in return for which the firm receives a constant annual sum at regular intervals 
over the "future" period. 
It is  possible to use these facts in analysing the cut-off rates in period zero, using 
an argument similar to that presented fat two-period investments in section III. 
While this argument is deficient to the extent that it does not consider the future of the 
firm beyond fifty years, it is thought that for the task of deriving period zero cut-off 
rates, the future of the firm beyond fifty years does not matter very much anyway. A 
diagram such as figure 1 is used to facilitate the argument. 
Funds in period zero are shown on the x-axis .  There is a limit OX to these funds,  
which may be either internally or externally imposed. On the y-axis is shown the 
equivalent constant annual returns available to the firm from investing successive 
increments of period zero resources in projects along the productive opportunity 
curve XABC. This curve shows the internal investment opportunities open to the 
firm and its slope at any point is given by the ratio S* /Co .  This ratio approximately 
equals the internal rate of return available from the project, as can be seen from the 
following table. 
E 
� -
-
-
-
- - I �---- L \ l ��--� �-- -� \ 
I -� \ 
L ____ __ ___ j____ _ __ _____ ----��--��-· 
0 F X 
Fig. 7.-Multi-period investments under single-period rationing 
Ko 
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TABLE 1 0  
Relationship between the internal rate o f  return and the ratio S*/Co 
Internal rate of return 
% 
0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5 
1 0  
1 5  
20 
25 
This table is based on the equation for internal rate of return 
r = S *  - S *  l 
Co C�- (1 + r)50 
S*/Co 
% 
2 
5 . 43 
1 0 . 1 
1 5 . 05 
20 . 05 
25 . 05 
For internal rates of return in excess of 5 %, the ratio S * J Co is a good estimate of the 
internal rate of return. Therefore, projects on the segment of the curve XA have 
higher internal rates of return than projects on the segment AG because the slope of 
the curve at all  points on XA exceeds the slope at all  points on AG. 
It was assumed in section III,1 0 5 that a common schedule of time preference 
rates for the ordinary shareholders was known and could be drawn as a series of 
indifference curves. The same assumption is initially made in this section. However, 
only one of these curves is drawn in figure 7 and this is the curve u 0 • 
The slope of the line XE represents the cost of capital of the limited funds OX. 
Thi s cost is  the rate of return availabl e by investing period zero resources in the best 
available opportunity external to the firm. If all period zero funds were invested in 
this external opportunity, OE funds would be generated in period one. 
The line BD has the same slope as XE, and is a tangent to the productive opport­
unity curve at the point B .  
The cut-off rate under corporate profit maximization 
Suppose the firm is obliged to distribute OF funds as dividends in period zero 
because the ordinary sh areholders demand this amount or because other factors appl y .  
I f  the firm had n o  restrictions o n  available funds and did not have t o  pay any dividends 
it would invest in internal proj ects along the productive opportunity curve up to the 
point B where the marginal internal rate of return equals the cost of capital. To engage 
in proposals along the segment of the curve BC would be detrimental to the firm' s 
profitability, because the internal rates of return on projects in this segment are less 
than the cost of capital . The optimum investment would be to accept internal projects 
from X to the point B on XABC, and to invest remaining funds in the "next-best" 
opportunity represented by the cost of capital line BD. The firm would generate OD 
funds in period one. 
However, since a funds limit XF is imposed, the firm is in a situation of capital 
rationing. The optimum investment is to accept projects from X to G along the 
productive opportunity curve. The cut-off point is the internal rate of return of the 
project just rejected and is represented by the slope of the productive opportunity 
curve at the point G. 
Predetermined cut-off rate under corporate profit maximization 
Where the array of investment proposals needed to discover the correct cut-off 
rate is not known in advance, a predetermined cut-off rate is required to evaluate 
proposals as they come to hand. If discounted cash flow methods of capital expen­
diture analysis have been used in the past, this cut-o ff  rate would be the internal rate 
1 05 See above, p.  108.  
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o f  return o f  the project just accepted i n  a past capital rationing period. Ideally, fo r 
this to be the correct rate, the time period over which all proposals were compared in 
the past has to be identical to the time span covered by current investment projects . 
In addition, the level of available investment funds in this past capital rationing period 
must approximate the level of current investment funds, and all projects in the past 
peri od should be of comparable profitability to current proposals . These requirements 
are imposed for the same reasons governing the restrictions on deriving the predeter­
mined cut- off rate for two-period investments . 1 0 6  
Where the firm has  not used discounted cash flow techniques in  the past, but 
has been subjected to single period rati oning in some years, derivation of the appro­
priate predetermined cut-off rate in the current period is  slightly more complicated. 
It will  be recalled that once the cash flows from any project are compared over 
fifty years, the assumed life of the longest project currently under consideration, it is 
possible to convert the series of uneven cash flow into a series of equal annual cas h 
flows . These equal annual cash flows were given by S *  in figure 7. The internal rate of 
return of any project is 
S *  r = S *  
Co Co ( 1  + r)50 
It was shown previously that for values of r in excess of 5 %, the rati o S *  /C 0 is a good 
estimate of the internal rate of return. The reciprocal of this ratio, that is  Co is the 
S* 
project's  payback period or the number of years taken to recoup the original outlay.  
Therefore, the reciprocal of the payback period for any fifty year project i s  a good 
estimate of that proposal's internal rate of return.107 
The task of deriving a predetennined cut-off rate where the firm has not used 
discounted cash flow methods in the past can make use of this relationship between the 
payback reciprocal and the internal rate of return. If in a past instance of single 
peri od capital rationing the firm had available approximately the same level of funds 
as at present, and all projects were analysed over a fifty-year time span and were of 
comparable profitability to current year projects, then the payback reciprocal of the 
project just accepted in that prior year may provide a good estimate of the predeter­
mined cut-off rate in the current period.108 It is satisfactory provided this project just 
accepted has fairly even cash flows. 
If the project just accepted during the previous instance of single-period rationing 
does not meet the latter requirement, then the cuuent predetermined cut-off rate is 
not the payback reciprocal of this project. However, the estimate provided by thi s 
ratio should be used a� a first approximation of the correct predetermined rate . 
Factors such as the life of the proposal and the irregularity of cash flows are con­
sidered in estimating the required cut-off rate. For instance, if the early cash flows 
from the project were fairly high compared with the proj ect' s expected returns in 
later years, then the payback period should be lengthened . The resulting estimate of 
the internal rate of return would be lower than if the straight payback reciprocal was 
used. The objective in performing these manipulati ons is to find the payback period 
that would result from the project if it b ad equal annual cash flows over a very long 
period. 
106 See above, p .  1 1 2. 
107 For further information concerning the relationship between the payback reciprocal and the 
internal rate of return see Myron J. Gordon, "The Payoff Period and the Rate of Profit",  Journal of 
Business, 28 (October 1955) : 253-60. 
108 The reason for taking the payback reciprocal on the project just accepted rather than just 
rejected in the past has been explained in the discussion of predetermined cut-off rates for two-period 
projects. See above, p. 1 1 2 .  
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It may be argued that the levels of available funds ,  the relative profitability of 
investment projects and the time span for evaluation in prior periods of capital 
rationing could differ from their current year counterparts .  If this occurs, the internal 
rate of return of the project just accepted in the past or its payback reciprocal as the 
case may be, would not be the correct predetermined cut-off rate. In most sophis­
ticated businesses it is  probable that long-range corporate planning extends up to a 
fixed period in the future, such as the fifty-year horizon used in this study. All plan­
ning in prior years would cover a time span of equal length to the current planning 
period. Therefore, projects in prior years may be assumed to be evaluated over the 
same life span as current year projects. 
However, there is no easy way around the problem posed where levels of funds 
and project profitabilities currently applicable differ from their prior year equivalents . 
As pointed out earlier, the levels of investment resources and the relative profit­
abilities of available projects determine the shape and position of the investment 
opportunity curve. In using cut-off rates in prior capital rationing periods as a guide 
to the current predetermined rate, it is assumed that the productive opportunity 
curve in prior years resembles its current equivalent. This it will not do where the level 
of funds and profitabilities of current investment projects do not resemble their past 
counterparts . In these circumstances, reliance upon cut-off rates in prior years should 
be viewed with suspicion. 
The only answer thought possible would be to allow management to weigh up 
the changes in profitability and volume of investment funds and the probable effect 
they might have on the cut-off rate. For instance, where the profitabi lity of projects 
has increased and the volume of funds has not changed, the new cut-off rate should 
exceed the old. The cut-off rate last year should be used as a lower limit to the current 
year rate, despite the fact that last year the firm did not suffer from capital rationing. 
In many instances where all projects are divisible, project profitabilities may only 
differ slightly from year to year. If the cut-off rate last year was 10 %, the current 
year cut-off rate must exceed 10 % as the volume of available funds is restricted. 
The cut-off rate under the maximization of ordinary shareholders' wealth 
Where the goal of the firm is the maximization of the wealth of its ordinary 
shareholders, derivation of the correct cut-off rate proceeds in a similar fashion to the 
derivation of this rate for two-period projects . 1 09 A diagram such as figure 8 can be 
used for this purpose. 
Ordinary shareholders' wealth is maximized by choosing that combination of 
current dividends and multi-period investments which places them on the highest 
indifference curve possible. This is the indifference curve which is just tangent to the 
productive opportunity curve XABC. This is shown in figure 8 as the curve u 0 which is 
tangent to the curve XABC at the point A. The optimum investment for the firm is to 
accept projects along XABC from X to A. This means that XG funds are invested in 
multi-period investments, and the remainder GO is distributed as dividends. 
The cut-off rate is the internal rate of return of the project just rejected, and is  
represented by the slope of the productive opportunity curve at the point A .  
Predetermined cut-off rate under the maximization o f  ordinary shareholders' 
wealth 
As discussed previously,U0 there is no way that this ideal cut-off rate can be 
obtained in practice. The reasons for this are firstly the interdependence between the 
1 09 See above, p. 1 1 3 .  
1 1 0  S ee  above, pp. 1 1 3-14.  
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slope of the productive opportunity curve and the cut-off rate, and. secondly the non­
existence of a common schedule of ordinary shareholders'  time preference rates, 
partly represented by the indifference curve u0 •  
\ 
0 G X Ko 
Fig. 8.-Analysis o f  multi-period investments under single-period rationing 
Therefore, the subj ective discount rate of management is suggested as an alter­
native. It is determined by the consumption and investment preferences of manage­
ment. As in the case of two-period itivestments,111 it is assumed that management 
has the best interests of the ordinary shareholders at heart. If it did not, then the 
cut-off rate determined may not maximize the wealth of these shareholders. 
This subjective discount rate should be determined using as a guide the rates of 
return on projects just accepted in previous instances of single-period capital rationing. 
However, this should be subject to th e following conditions. For the same reasons 
given in the discussion of predetermined cut-off rates for two-period projects, the 
volume of funds available in past instances of single-peri od capital rationing should 
approximate current funds, the projects submitted in the past should have been of 
comparable profitability to current multi-period investments, and the goal of manage­
ment in the past should have been to maximize the wealth of the ordinary shareholders. 
All projects should have been evaluated over the same time period. 
In the previous discussion112 of predetermined cut-off rates under the assumption 
of corporate profit maximization, the situation in which some of the above conditions 
were not applicable was discussed. Jn particular, consideration was given to the prob­
lems arising when the volume of investment funds and project profitabilities in the 
current year differed from their prior year equivalents. These same problems are 
present in deriving a predetermined cut-off rate under the goal of ordinary shareholders 
1 1 1  See above, p. 1 14.  
1 12 See above, p.  1 22. 
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wealth maximization. The only solution that can be offered is for management to 
weigh up the various changes in these two variables, project profitability and level of 
investment funds, and to investigate the possible effects these changes could have on 
the cut-off rate. 
Use of predetermined rates to evaluate projects 
The following example will be used to illustrate how the pred etermined cut-off 
rates derived in this section may be used to evaluate a multi-period project coming 
to the attention of management in a single capital rationing period. Suppose that the 
cut-off rate applicable in the capital rationing period has been determined. as 15 %. In 
all non-rationing periods the cut-off rate equals the cost of capital and is 10 %. The 
goal of the firm does not matter for this illustration ; it co uld be either corporate 
profit maximization or maximizati on of ordinary shareholders' wealth.  
A project with an economic life of five years is to be evaluated. However, since 
the planning horizon of the firm is fifty years and all projects under consideration are 
being evaluated over this period, it has been estimated that the cash inflows fro m  the 
project can be reinvested in the firm to return $10  every year up to the planning 
horizon. The resultant net cash flow pattern of the proposal takes the following form.11 3 
TABLE 11 
Net cash flows from five-year project 
Year , I 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
-- -
Cut-off rate 15 % 1 0 %  1 0 %  1 0 %  10 % 10 % 10 % 
- -- --
Net cash 
flow ($1081-19) $100 $1 000 $300 $100 $100 $ 10  
Note: All cash flows are assumed t o  occur at year-end. 
. . . . . .  I 
· · · · · .  
. . . . . .  
I 
49 50 
1 0 %  10 % 
$10  $ 10 
The internal rate of return for this project is " 1 9  %, computed in table 12 .  
TABLE 1 2  
Intemal rate o f  return for five-year project 
Year Net cash flow Discount factor Present value 
at 1 9 %  
$ $ 
0 (1081-1 9) I (1 081-19) 
1 100-00 
I 
. 840336 84-03 
2 1000-00 . 7061 65 706-16 
3 300-00 . 593416 1 78-02 
4 100-00 . 498669 49-87 
5 100-00 . 352142 
6 1 0-00 
63-1 1 
50 10-00 . 0001 67 
Net present value Nil 
1 1 3  Discount factors are obtained from Merrett and Sykes, The Finance and Analysis of Capital 
Projects, pp. 5 1 0-29. 
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With a cut-off rate of 1 5 % in the current year, a 1 9 % internal rate of return 
signifies project acceptance. 
The net present value of this proposal is evaluated by discounting the net cash 
flows in each year to their present values in year zero, using as discount rates the 
cut-off rate applicable in each year. This gives a net present value of $ 1 95-22 as shown 
in table 1 3 . This positive net present value again signifies project acceptance. In 
dd. . h al . d 
. 1 276-41 1 1 8  1 . di . h h . a ttlon, t e present v ue m ex IS 1 08 1 _ 1 9  o r  . , a s o  an m catiOn t at t e project should be accepted. 
TABLE 13 
Net present value of five-year project 
Year Net cash ' Discount factors I Present value Present value 
flow at 10 % of cash inflows at of all cash flows 
year 1 at year zero 
s s 
0 (1081-1 9) (1081-19) 
1 100-00 1 . 000000 100-00 
2 1 000-00 . 909091 909--{)9 
3 300-00 . 826446 247-93 
4 100--{)0 . 751 3 1 5 75-13  
5 100--{)0 . 68301 3 
6 1 0-00 . 620921 
1 35-66 
so 10-00 . 009370 I 
Discount factor at 1 5 % . 869565 I 1467-8 1 1276--41 
Net present value $1 95-22 
It is of interest to note the following difficulty experienced by the internal rate of 
return criterion. Suppose that capital rationing is not experienced in period zero as 
before, but is now imposed on the firm in period one. The cut-off rate in period zero 
returns to 1 0 %, and because very stringent capital rationing is imposed in period one, 
the cut-off rate in the latter year soars to 50 %.  All other cut-off rates are unchanged. 
In these circumstances, the internal rate of return for the project does not change, 
being 1 9 % as computed in table 12 .  With a period zero cut-off rate of 10 %  the project 
is still acceptable using this criterion. 
However, the net present value and present value index criteria tell a different 
story. From table 14, the net present value of the project is now -$55 .46 .The present 
value index is �gii=i�or .95. The figures for both these criteria signify that the project 
should be rejected. 
The conflict in accept or reject decisions arises from the different assumptions 
underlying each criterion. With the internal rate of return it is assumed either that 
capital outstanding in the project is recovered at a constant rate per annum equal to 
the internal rate of return, or that cash benefits from the project can be reinvested in 
the firm at the internal rate of return.114 Both these assumptions are negated when 
reinvestments in period one must return at least 50 % per year to be accepted. On 
1 14 See above, p. 1 0 1 .  
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the other hand, both the net present value and present value index criteria assume 
that cash benefits are reinvested at the cut-off rate in each year, so they both take the 
high peri od one cut-off rate into account. The decision to reject the project, given by 
both these criteria, is the correct one. 
TABLE 14 
Net present value of five-year project when capital rationing occurs in year one 
�
=
-
�
�
--
· -
:�=
��,
"
' 
I �.�,��,.,� ::!ii.�� :,;�,., 
iE:.�\ 
flow at 1 0 %  I flows in at SO % flows in at 10 % flows in year 2 year 1 year zero ------ �---- -----$ $ $ 
0 ( 1 0 8 1 - 1 9) 1 . 000000 (108 1 --1 9) 
1 100--00 I .  000000 1 00-QO 
1 1 000-{)0 1 . 000000 1000-QO 
3 300-00 . 909091 272-73 
4 1 00-00 . 826446 82-64 
5 1 00-00 . 75 1 3 1 5  
6 1 0-00 . 6830 1 3 
1 87-25 
so 1 0.:.oo 1 . 0103 07 
___ ._� __ _____ ____ _ 
1 542-62 . 666667 1 028-41 
jl128=4l- . 909091 
Net present value 
1 025--72 
($55-46) 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this example is  that the internal rate of 
return should not be trusted to give the correct accept/reject decision where the firm 
is likely to experience capital rati oning in single future periods. 
:Further complications arising from single-period rationing 
Even though the cut-ofi rates for single-period rationing have been found, the 
difficulties caused by this restriction are not completely solved. Because capital 
funds are limited in the current period only, management should consider the pos­
sibilty of postponing some projects until later years when they may be undertaken 
quite freely. Essential projects wh ich meet the required standards of acceptability 
could be undertaken during the single rationing period, and other projects whose 
profitability is  not likely to suffer because of postponement could be deferred. In this 
way, the long-term benefits to the firm will be maximized.115 
Summary of analysis for single-period rationing 
In future periods when all restrictions on available funds are lifted, there are 
identical cut-off rates applicable under either the goal of corporate profit maxi­
mization or the goal of maximizing ordinary shareholders' wealth. These rates are the 
1 1 5 For a discussion of project postponement under these conditions see Stephen A. Marglin, 
Approaches to Dynamic Investment Planning (Amsterdam : North-Holland Publishing Co., 1 963), 
pp. 37-62. 
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firm's cost of capital in these future years. The cut-off rates derived for the cur rent 
period when single-period rationing applies, are summarized in table 1 5 .  
TABLE 15 
Summary of first year cut-off rates for multi-period investments under single-period rationing 
Goal of firm 
Corporate profit maximization 
Maximization of ordinary 
shareholders' wealth 
M u l t i-pe r i od rat i o n i ng 
Theoretical cut-off 
rate 
--- -- ---
Predetermined cut-off 
rate 
Internal rate of return of the I Payback reciprocal on project project just rejected just accepted in previous single rationing period 
Internal rate of return of pro- Subjective discount rate of 
ject lying at the point of tan- management 
gency of productive oppor-
tunity curve and shareholders' 
i ndifference curves 
If restrictions on investment funds are imposed over several periods, the timing 
and magnitude of future cash flows from current investments becomes very important. 
Not only do these future cash flows play a role in determining projects' acceptability 
now, but also their timing and magnitude can help to determine the volume of funds 
available in future periods for investments and dividend payments. 
The cut-off rates in future years can be u sed to determine which proj ects are 
currently accepted. But these cut-off rates depend on the volume of funds available in 
the future and this depends on the proposals which are accepted now. This circularity 
is the essence of the probl em involved in computing cut-off rates under multi-period 
rationing. 
In planning a multiperiod. investment programme the fact that the time- series 
of discount rates for proposals adopted in period one depends upon the pro­
grammes undertaken in every subsequent year might suggest that the programme 
should. be planned backwards from the terminal peri od to the initial period. 
Unfortunately this approach encounters the further difficulty that the financial 
constraints ruling in the later periods of a multiperiod problem may be a function 
of the cash-flows of the projects undertaken in the earlier periods . ns 
In addition to this difficulty, the cut-off rates for future periods are likely to 
fluctuate quite significantly because of the multi-period funds constraint. The firm 
has no access to the extern al capital market during these periods, and sole reliance on 
internal generation may cause wide fluctuations in the volume of funds available 
each year. This causes variations in future cut-off rates.  
To assume a constant cost of capital over future years is  a less tenable assumption 
under capital rationing conditions than under normal conditions. This is 
especially so when capital rationing takes the form of raising no further capital 
at all, relying entirely on self generated funds, i .e .  depreciation provisions and 
retained profits. These latter can fluctuate s ignificantly from year to year. To 
calculate the marginal cost of capital in such circumstances, however, involves 
forecasting all likely investment proj ects for many years ahead, together with all 
the funds which they in turn would generate.117 
1 1 6  Lawson and Windle, Capital Budgeting, p.  60. 
117 Merrett and Sykes, The Finance and Analysis of Capital Projects, p. 141 . They use the term 
"cost of capital" in the same sense as the term "cut-off rate" has been used in this study. 
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The discounting methods discussed in this study are useless i n  the face of this 
multi-period funds restriction, "a problem which is pervaded by some extremely 
complicated feed-backs and interrelationships" . 118 Mathematical programming 
techniques represent the only means by which project selection under these conditions 
can be achieved. However, these techniques are beyond the scope of this study and 
. will not be pursued further. 119 
The rationale behind multi-period rationing and the methods of project selection 
used to cope with it must be questioned when this funds restriction is  internally 
impo sed. It was shown earlier1 20 that the continual imposition of funds restrictions 
on the firm is contrary to the objective of profit-making. Both the firm and its ordinary 
shareholders suffer because this imposition starves the firm of otherwise profitable 
projects over a long period, and its prosperity and future growth are effectively 
cramped. The use of mathematical programming techniques to ration funds in these 
circumstances does not really overcome th e basic problem facing the firm. Manage­
ment should realise that their actions in restricting fu nds are affecting both the firm 
and its ordinary shareholders, and the funds limit which is retarding the prosperity 
of the firm should be lifted. 
The imposition of a succession of financial constraints upon successive budgeting 
periods is to compromise the raison d'etre of business enterprise-the profit­
making motive. Multiperiod self-imposed capital rationing is thus a policy of 
second best. The very notion of using sophisticated programming techniques to 
achieve the objectives of a policy of second best is tantamount to setting the 
objective of doing the wrongs things very well . 1 21 
E m p i r ical  r es u l ts 
Having discussed at some length the cut-off rates for multi-period investments 
under capital rati oning, an examination will now be made of current practice in 
Australia to observe how businessmen actually go about adjusting cut-off rates under 
capital rationing. Evidence is obtained from the survey of listed Australian public 
companies carried out by the writer. 
However, before a detailed analysis of the findings of the survey are given, it is 
beneficial to note the number of companies using discounted cash flow methods, 
because many respondents not using these techniques indicated that they too set 
minimum cut-off rates for use with their arbitrary methods of capital expenditure 
analysis. Most information can be gained from the empirical data if it is divided into 
two sections : tho se firms that do use discounting methods and those that do not. 
Companies in the sample were asked : 
1 .  Does your firm use discounted cash flow techniques in capital expenditure 
analysis ? 
1 . Yes 
2. No 
Forty-two companies answered yes to this question, but from the qualifications 
attached to many of these responses, discounted cash flow is not used all the time by 
all these firms.  This response represented 24.4 % of the sample.u2 
A prerequisite to ascertaining whether companies modify their cut-off rates 
when funds are rati oned is  to discover whether they set a cut-off rate when funds are 
unlimited. The following question was asked : 
1 1 8 Lawson and Windle, Capital Budgeting, p. 60. 
1 1 9 Readers interested in the mathematical progranmling approach to capital rationing are 
referred to Baumol and Quandt, "Investment and Discount Rates" .  
· 
1 20 See above, p. 98.  
121  Lawson and Windle, Capital Budgeting, pp . 60-61 . 
1 22 The 95 % confidence limits for the proportion of the population using discounted cash flow 
techniques were computed to be 20 %  and 3 1 %. 
C UT-OFF RATES U N DER CA PITA L RATIO N I N G  1 29 
4. Does your Company ever set a minimum rate of return % standard for 
proposal acceptance ? 
1 .  Yes 
2 . No 
The results of this question are summarized in table 1 6 . 1 2 3  
TABLE 1 6  
Analysis of cut-off rates when funds are unlimited 
Use discounted Do not use discounted 
cash flow cash flow 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Set a minimum rate 36 8 5 . 7  45 36 . 6  
D o  not set a minimum rate 6 14 . 3  78 63 . 4 
Total 42 100 . 0  1 1 23 1 00 . 0  
It i s  interesting t o  observe that 85 .7 % of those companies using discounted cash 
flow methods set a minimum cut-off rate. This is far higher than the corresponding 
proportion for companies not using discounted methods . 
Those companies setting a minimum cut-off rate were then asked whether this 
rate increased when capital rationing was imposed. The specific question was : 
5. If the answer to question 4 is "yes," and your finn is always or occasional y 
short of funds for capital expenditure, does this minimum rate of return ever 
increase when funds are short ? 
1 .  Yes 
2 . No 
The results from this question1 24 are summarized in table 1 7. 
TABLE 17 
Variations in the minimum cut-off rate when funds are rationed 
I 
I Use discounted cash Do not use discounted I I flow flow I 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Increase minimum cut-off 
rate 4 14 . 3  7 1 7 . 1  
Do not increase minimum 
cut -off rate 24 85 . 7  34 82 . 9  
Total 28 100 . 0  41 100 . 0  
·-·· 
1 23 Note that all companies in the sample did not answer this question. 
1 24 Only 69 of the 81 companies in the sample that do set a minimum cut-off rate answered this 
question. 
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Regardless of whether discounted cash flow methods are used or not, it would 
appear that very few firms increase their minimum cut-off rates when funds are 
short. Those companies that do were asked to outline how they determined the new 
rate. Replies were received from three companies which use discounting methods . 
One company stated that the new rate was determined "very arbitrarily" ; another 
said that "only the most profitable projects are considered" ; while the third stated 
"preference is shown to projects showing better than standard % return, all other 
aspects being equal". 
These replies · are not very heartening and would suggest that firms lack know­
ledge of theoretical methods for dealing with rationed funds. 
Some companies using discounting indicated that they did not increase their 
minimum rate of return but tended to concentrate on projects which had reduced 
elements of risk. This was evidenced in two replies received. One stated that the 
company tried to reduce risk factors in the proposals being considered ; the other 
indicated that it switched from discounting to payback as a capital expenditure 
evaluation method when funds were short. Risk factors are crucial in any capital 
project and their elimination is commendable especially when funds are tight, but 
since this study only considered proj ects with equal or negligible degrees of risk, this 
aspect was not given any consideration in the previous theoretical discussion. 
Conclusions 
In this secti on, it has been demonstrated that the analysis developed for two­
period investments in section III may be extended to encompass multi-period invest­
ments under single-peri od rationing. The cash flows for any project should be dis­
c ounted to present values using a series of cut-off rates : those rates applying in future 
years, and the rate applying in the current period wh en single-period rationing is 
imposed . Future cut- off rates are equal to the firm's cost of capital although its 
measure will depend on whether the goal of the firm is corporate profit maximization 
or maximization of ord inary shareholders' wealth. The cut-off rate in the current 
period also depends on which of these goal s is applicable . Care should be taken when 
single period rati oning occurs in a future year . The internal rate of return criterion may 
not give the correct accept/reject decision for a project in this case, and the net present 
value of present value index criteria are preferred. 
Multi-period rationing is likely to apply in some governmental organizations 
where the availability of funds over many yel;lrs depends on appronriations from a 
central treasury. In these cases,  use of sophisticated mathematical techniques for 
allocating resources among projects is j ustified . However, such methods should not 
be used where the funds restriction is  internally imposed. 
It was disappointing to discover that public compani es in Australia seem to 
lack knowledge of correct techniques to cope with capital rationing. Since capital 
rationing is  so prevalent in the business environment, one would hope that progress 
in this area is made rapidly. From results of the survey performed by this writer , it 
can only be concluded that, in all probability, incorrect investment deci s ions are 
currently being made. 
V .  C O N C L U S I O N S 
A capital rationing situation has been defined as one in which the firm either 
cannot or does not wish to raise sufficient funds for all capital expenditure proposals 
deemed profitable. It was the aim of this study to examine the behaviour of cut-off 
rates in capital expenditure analyses when a firm is subjected to capital rationing. 
Usefulness in ascertaining project acceptability constitutes the main function of 
cut-off rates.  They are used as the minimum acceptable rates of return for comparisons 
with the internal rate of return criterion, and as the chosen rates of discount in com-
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puting net present value and the present value index. However, before this examination 
of cut-o ff  rates could be carried out, it was necessary to discover whether firms are 
currently suffering capital rationing, since there is no point in describing detailed 
theoretical techniques to deal with something that does not exist. 
From a survey carried out by the writer, it was found that 87.2 % of the li sted 
Australian public companies in the sample experienced capital rationing, the 95 % 
confidence interval for the percentage of all similarly ailected li sted pu blic companie s  
being 8 1 .8 % t o  9 1 .2 %·  To a great extent, this restriction on funds was imposed b y  
management. Of t h e  companies sampled 83 .7 % experienced this internal capital 
rationing. On the other hand, external capital rationing, or investment restriction from 
outside the firm , was experienced by only 39 .5 % of the sample. 
Because of these findings, an analysis of cut-off rates under capital rationing wa s 
thought to be warranted. This analysis was commenced in section III and was devel­
oped in section IV. After presentation and criticism of the "conventional analysis" of 
cut-off rates under capital ratio ning, two-pet iod investments under either external or 
internal rationing were introduced. By focussing on investments which terminated 
after two years, the aim was to isolate one issue overlooked by the conventional 
analysis . This was the fact that differing goals of the firm could alter the cut-off rate 
for capital projects and the volume of funds available for dividend payments . A firm 
under either external or internal capital rationing has to decide how much of its 
limited funds to make available for capital expenditures and how much to pay out as 
dividends. Dividend. payments and levels of capital expenditure are closely linked 
where funds are rationed since an increase in one automatically leads to a reduction 
in the other. Volumes of funds made available for each of these tasks differ depending 
on whether the goal of the firm is maximization of the wealth of its ordinary share­
holders or corporate profit maximization. Once the volume of investment funds has 
been determined under these goals, the analysis in section III demon strated how 
completely separate cut-off rates applied for each goal. This resulted in different 
projects being accepted in each case. Where all two-period investments are not known 
in advance, predetermined cut-off rates were introduced. Any two-period. project 
coming to the attention of management throughout the year may be evaluated u sing 
the predetermined rate. Either the internal rate of return, net present value or present 
value index criteria are available for this evaluation. 
It was thought that an organization having only two-period investments to 
consider would be an exception to the norm, and that most firms would be consider­
ing only multi-period projects . Therefore, the argument provided in section III was 
expanded to cater for this situation. In so doing, several issues overlooked in the 
conventional analysi s were discussed . These were the implications of single-period 
and multi-peri od rationing, and equating the useful lives of projects under consider­
ation. For a situation of single-period rationing, theoretically correct cut�off rates and 
their predetet mined equivalents were derived under either the goal of corporate 
profit maximization or the goal of ordinary shareholders' wealth maximization. 
However, these cut-off rates should be used only with the net present value or the 
present value index criteria.  The optimum investment decision can be made by reducing 
cash flows to their present values using the cost of capital as discount factor in all 
non-rationing periods and the cut-off rates determined in section lV for the period in 
which capital rationing applies . 
In deriving these cut-off rates,  all projects were compared over the life of the 
longest investment considered, in this case fifty years.  This necessitated proj ections of 
reinvested cash flows from shorter lived projects over the interim period . These pro­
j ections would need to be derived from long-range planning activities within the 
organization. The advantage of this comparison over fifty years is that all cash flows 
attributable to current projects and. their reinvested. proceeds can be compared on 
equal terms and no unfair advantage is given to long-lived proj ects with resultant bias 
to the cut-off rate . 
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Where capital rationing is imposed over several periods, this  study cannot 
provide any cut-off rates for capital expenditure evaluation. So many complicated 
feed-backs and inter-relationships exist between the future cut-off rates and the 
batch of projects presently under consideration that the only correct means of selection 
is  to use mathematical programming techniques .  This is only recommended in cases 
where rationing is  externally imposed. Relief from this fu nd limitation is  largely 
beyond the control of firms since the tmderlying cause is market imperfections . 
Management is justified in attempting to achieve tl1e best allocation of limited funds 
in this case. Where multi-period rationing is internally imposed, use of these sophis­
ticated techniques is  not justified. If the goal of the firm is to maximize corporate 
profits or to maximize the wealth of its ordinary shareholders, multi-period internal 
capital rationing is of doubtful logic. Such a policy will never lead to the attainment of 
these profitability goals and will only stifle the potential growth and prosperity of the 
firm. Of course, if internal capital rationing is imposed in one period only, and there 
could be justifiable reasons for this, the cut-off rates developed in section IV may be 
used to arrive at the optimum combination of proj ects .  
The analysis presented in this study should be subject to two qualifications. 
Firstly, the assumption was made that all projects are divisible and independent. 
This resulted in the smooth demand curves for capital in the conventional analysi s ,  
and the smooth productive opportunity curves drawn i n  the analysis o f  cut-off rates 
with two-period and multi-period projects.  Where this assumption does not hold., the 
necessity might arise for a ranking of projects to obtain the set of investments that 
best uses the funds available. Thi s aspect of project selection has not been considered. 
Secondly, a significant aspect of proj ect evaluation is the degree of risk attached to 
expected future cash flows. Further research is needed to determine the effect on 
cut-off rates under capital rationing in these circumstances . 
Capital rationing is a phenomenon which affects many businesses.  Although 
some cannot escape from it and are continually forced to make investment decisions 
in its shadow, there are other companies where internally imposed restrictions could 
be lifted so that every profitable investment opportunity is utilized. Firms in the latter 
circumstances are urged to relax their fund restrictions. For organizations where 
capital rationing is imposed either externally or internally in isolated single periods , it 
is hoped that the cut-off rates derived in this study are used to achieve the best allo­
cation of limited resources.  
APPE N D I X  I 
Sou rce d ata 
The population data for the survey of listed Australian public companies come 
from stock exchange listings of companies in Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, 
Perth and Hobart, at 30 June 1969. Before these data can be used, however, it is 
necessary to eliminate all multiple listings of companies, so that each appears once. The 
reason for this is that each company in the population should have an equal chance of 
selection. A firm listed in b oth Sydney and Melbourne, for instance, would have 
twice the normal chance of selection and so this double listing must be eli minated. 
Sam p l e  s i ze 
The main requirement of the sample is to discover the percentage of listed public 
companies experiencing capital rationing. If it could be assumed that n samples are 
taken from the population, and a note made of the percentage in each experiencing 
capital rationing, the statistical distribution of these percentages would approximate a 
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normal distribution. 1 9 5  The mean of the distribution of sample percentages is TT (the 
true population percentage), and the standard derivation is  ap (the standard error) . 
The relationship between the st andard error and the true population percentage 
is given by the following equation : 
Up 
= J TT( l n=-TT) 
where n is  the required sample size. 
The 95 % confidence interval for TT is  TT ± 1 . 96 ap. If a sample proportion p, is obtained 
from this distribution, it can be stated that the true population lies inside the limits 
p ± 1 . 96 p with 95 % confidence. 126  
To obtain a sample size, the judgment of the investigator must be exercised. A 
maximum tolerable deri vati on from the true population percentage must be stipulated 
That is, 1 . 96ap must be given a specific value. The writer chose .075 .  
1 . 96up .075 Up = .075 
1 .96 
Now, up = 
(.075) 2 = 
( 1 .96) 2  
J TT(l n �2 
TT(l - TT) 
n =  
n 
TT( l - TT) 
(.075) ll 
( 1 .96)2 
To obtain the largest sample size necessary in these circumstances, it is necessary 
to impute values for 7T and 1 - 7T that maximize the numerator of this equation. The 
expression 7T(l - 7T) is maximized only when 7T = . 5  
nmax = . 5  . .  5 
(.075) 2 
( 1 . 96) 2 
1 72 .  
Therefore, the sample size taken for this survey is 1 72 .  
The sample is stratified into 7 industry groups using the following equation : u7 
Number of Companies in Stratum A . sample = Number of Companies 
Total Companies in Population size in the Sample from 
Stratum A. 
The numbers of companies in each stratum are shown in table 1 8 .  
1 25 This occurs by virtue of the Central Limit Theorem. See Brunk, A n  Introduction to Mathe­
matical Statistics, pp. 1 64-69. 
1 26 See Croxton and Cowden, Applied General Statistics, pp. 671 -75. 
127 It should be appreciated that this method of stratification is not the most accurate available. 
Better methods use a weighted average ratio of companies in one stratum to the total population. 
The weighting factor is the standard deviation in each population stratum. However, since these 
standard deviations in the strata are not known, the method actually used is satisfactory. 
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Stratum 
Finance 
Heavy Industry 
Light Manufacturing 
Primary Industry 
Trade and Service 
Mining 
Oil 
Total 
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TABLE 18 
Number of companies sampled from each stratum 
Number in 
population 
1 50 
203 
390 
58 
414 
1 32 
48 
1 , 395 
Number in 
sample 
1 9  
25 
48 
7 
5 1  
1 6 
6 
1 72 
Using a set of random number tables, 1 28 the sample of 1 72 companies is selected from 
these strata. 
Confid ence l i mits fo r n 
It was stated in section II129 that the percentage of companies in the sample 
suffering from capital rationing was 87.2 .  To obtain the 95 % confidence limits for 
7T, the percentage of all listed Australian public companies experiencing capital 
rationing, the following formula may be used : 
z. o7s = P - 7T 
J n - ==7T2�N�-=n n . N - 1 
Where : Z. 975 = the X co-ordinate of a standard normal distribution, cutting-off an 
area of .025 in one "tail" of this distribution. 
p = sample percentage 
7T = population percentage 
N = total number of companies in population 
n = number in sample .  
N - n = finite population conection 
N - 1 
1 . 96 = . 872 - 7T 
J 7T - TT2 • 1 223 172 1 394 
Simplifying this equation gives a quadratic function of n. When solved, this gives 
the limits for 7T as 8 1 . 8 % and 9 1 .2 %-
1 28 See Brunk, An Introduction t o  Mathematical Statistics, pp.' 402-406. 
1 29 See above, p. 8 5 .  
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University of Queensland 
:Department of Accountancy 
SURVEY OF CAPITAL RATIONING IN AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC 
COMPANIES 
Company No_: 
Please (a) Use a tick mark ( v') to indicate the appropriate alternative ; and 
(b) Supply details where requested. 
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ALL INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE TREATED IN THE 
STRICTEST CONFID ENCE. ONLY AGGREGATED R ESULTS FROM ALL 
COMPANIES USED. 
1. Does your firm use discounted cash flow techniques in capital expenditure 
analysis ? 
1 .  Yes 
2 . No 
2. In any one capital budget period has the supply of funds been sufficient to finance 
all the acceptable (profitable) proposals submitted for consideration ? 
( 1 )  Always sufficient funds available for proposals . 
(2) Occasionally capital funds NOT sufficient for proposals. 
(3) Never sufficient funds for all proposals submitted. 
3. Has management ever ruled that total funds allocated to capital projects be 
limited to a predetermined amount ? 
1 .  Regularly 
2. Occasionally 
3. Never 
4. Does your Company ever set a minimum rate of return % standard for proposal 
acceptance ? 
I .  Yes 
2 . No 
5. If the answer to question 4 is "yes," and your firm is always or occasionally short 
of funds for capital expenditure, does this minimum rate of return ever increase 
when funds are short ? 
1 .  Yes 
2. No 
6.  If you answered "yes" to question 5, outline how you determine the new rate 
7. Is ca1-ital rationing in your Company : 
( 1 )  Caused by a desire of management to limit funds for capital expenditure 
proposals ? 
(2) Caused by restrictions being placed on the Company by external bodies ? 
(3) Caused by both these factors ? 
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8. If capital rationing is caused by external factors, are these 
( I )  Difficulties in obtaining funds from 
(a) banks and short-term creditors 
(b) the issue of debentures 
(c) the issue of new shares ? 
(2) Restrictions imp osed on the firm by Govt. authority ? 
(3) Restrictions imposed by existing debenture trust deeds ? 
(4) Other reasons (specify) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
9. Does your company limit fun ds available for capital expenditure proposals in 
specific areas and not others ? 
1 .  Yes 
2. No 
3. Sometimes 
1 0. If the answer to question 9 is "Yes" or "Sometimes," are funds limited in the case 
of: 
( I )  Expansionary proposals Company-wide (e.g.  buying a new factory) ? 
(2) Replacement proposals Company-wide ? 
(3) Expansionary proposals in a segment of the Company ?  
( 4) Replacement proposals in a segment of the Company ? 
Thank you for co-operating in this survey. 
Any comments (if you so desire) . 
C U T-OFF RATES U NDER C A PITA L RATIO N I N G  
S E L E CT E D  B I B L I OG RA P H Y  
Books 
1 3 7 
BAUMOL, WILLIAM J. Economic Theory and Operations Analysis. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1 965 . 
BIERMAN, HAROLD , JR. ,  and SMIDT, SEYMOUR . The Capital Budgeting Decision. 2nd ed. New York : 
Macmillian Co. ,  1 966. 
BRUNK, H.  D.  An Introduction to Mathematical Statistics. 2nd ed. Waltham, Massachusetts :  Blaisdell 
Publishing Co. of Ginn and Co. ,  1 965. 
CRoxTON, FREDERICK E. ,  and CoWDEN, DUDLEY J. Applied General Statistics. 2nd ed. London : Sir 
Isaac Pitman & Sons, 1 962. 
DJJAN, JoEL . Capital Budgeting: Top-Management Policy on Plant, Equipment, and Product Develop­
ment.  New York : Columbia University Press, 1951 . 
--- . Managerial Economics. Englewood Cliffs , New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1 95 1 .  
FISHER, IRVING. The Theory of Interest: As Determined by Impatience To Spend Income and Oppor­
tunity To Invest It. New York : Macmillan Co. ,  1 930. 
GRAHAM, BENJAMIN ; DoDD, DAVID L. ; and CoTTLE, SIDNEY. Security Analysis: Principles and 
Technique. 4th ed. New York : McGraw-Hill Book Co. ,  1 962. 
HlRSHLEIFER, JACK ; DE HAVEN, JAMES C. ; and MILUMAN, JEROME W. Water Supply: Economics, 
Technology, and Policy . Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1 960. 
HoRNGREN, CHARLES T. Cost Accounting: A Managerial Emphasis. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1 967. 
JAY, W. R[obert] C.,  and MATHEWS, R[ussell] L., eds . Government Accounting in A ustralia: A Book 
of Readings. Melbourne : F. W. Cheshire, 1 968 . 
JoHNSON, RoBERT W. Financial Management .  3rd ed. Boston : Allyn and Bacon, 1 966. 
LAWSON, G[ERALD] H., and WINDLE, D. W. Capital Budgeting and the Use of DCF Criteria in the 
Corporation Tax Regime. Ed inburgh and London : Oliver and Boyd , 1 967. 
MAROUN, STEPHEN A.  Approaches to Dynamic Investment Planning. Amsterdam : North-Holland 
Publishing Co.,  1963 .  
MEREDITH, G [EOFFREY] G. Capital Rationing and the Determination of the Firm's Performance Stan­
dards for Capital Investment Analysis. University of Queensland, Department of Accoun­
tancy Paper, Vol. I ,  No . 4, 1 965 . 
MERRETT, A[NTHONY] J., and SYKES, ALLEN. Capital Budgeting and Company Finance. London : 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1 966. 
---, ---. The Finance and Analysis of Capital Projects. London : Longmans, Green and Co.,  
1963 .  
MOSER, C. A. Survey Methods in Social Investigation. London : Heinemann Educational Books, 1 958 .  
PoRTERFIELD, JAMES T. S .  Investment Decisions and Capital Costs. Englewood Cl iffs, New Jersey : 
Prentice-Hall, 1 965. 
QUIRIN, G. DAVID. The Capital Expenditure Decision. Homewood , Ill inois : Richard D. Irwin, 1 967 . 
ScrrovSKY, TIBOR. Welfare and Competition : The Economics of a Fully Employed Economy. London : 
Unwin University Books, 1 952. 
VAN HORNE , JAMES C. Financial Management and Policy. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hal l ,  
1 968.  
WESTON, J. FRED, and BRIGHAM, EUGENE F. Managerial Finance. 2nd ed . New York : Holt ,  Rinehart 
and Winston, 1 966. 
WILLIAMS, JOHN B. The Theory of Investment Value. Cambridge :  Harvard University Press, 1 9 3 8 .  
Journal art ic les  
ALCHIAN, ARMEN A. "The Rate o f  Interest, Fisher's Rate o f  Return Over Costs and Keynes' Internal 
Rate of Return". American Economic Review 45 (December 1 955) : 93 8-43 . 
BAUMOL, WILLIAM J.,  and QUANDT, RICHARD E. "Investment and D iscount Rates Under Capital 
Rationing-A Programming Approach". Economic Jo urnal 15 (June 1965) : 3 1 7-29. 
BowEN, EDWIN A. "Problem Areas in Use of Discounted Cash flow for Investment Evaluation".  
NAA Bulletin 44 (August 1 963) : 1 1 -19 .  
BRoWN, VICTOR H. "Rate of Return : Some Comments on i ts  Applicab ility in Capital Budgeting" . 
Accounting Review 36 (January 1961) : 50-62. 
DRYDEN, MYLES M. "Capital Budgeting : Treatment of Uncertainty and Investment Criteria" .  
Scottish Journal of Political Economy 1 1  (November 1964) : 235-59. 
1 38 RICH A R D  D. M O RRIS 
GoRDON, MYRON J. "The Payoff Period and the Rate of Profit" . Jo urnal of Business 28 (October 
1 955) : 253-60. 
HART, ALBERT G.  "Anticipations , Bus iness Planning, and the Cycle".  Q uarterly Journal of Economics 
51 (February 1937) : 273-97. 
Hl:RSHLEIFER, J [ACK] . "On the Theory of Optimal Investment Dec ision". Jo urnal of Political Economy 
66 (August 1 958) : 329-52 . 
HoLZER, H. PETER , and FoRSYTH, JoHN D. " Mathematical Programming and the Rationing of Capital : 
Last in a Series" .  Cost and Management 42 (March 1 968) : 21 -24. 
LAWSON, GERALD H. "Capital Investment Criteria in B usiness-II".  A ccountant 148 (April 1963) : 
491 -96 . 
---. "Criteria To Be Observed in Judging a Capital Project-11" . Accountants Journal 56 (June 
1964) : 267-78 .  
MARSCHAK, THOMAS. "Capital Budgeting and Pricing i n  the French Nationalized Industries" .  
Jo urnal of Business 3 3  (April 1 960) : 1 3 3-56.  
MoDIGLIANI, FRANco, and MILLER, MERTON H. "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment".  American Economic Review 48 (June 1958) : 261-97. 
PREST, A. R., and TURVEY, R[ALPH] . "Cost-Benefit Analysis : A Survey".  Economic Jo urnal 75 
(December 1 965) : 683-735.  
RoBICHEK, ALEXANDER A. ; OGILVIE, DoNALD G. ; and RoACH, JoHN D .  "Capital Budgeting : A 
Pragmatic Approach" . Financial Executive 37 (April l 969) : 26-3 8 .  
ScHWAB, BERNHARD, and LusznG, PETER. "A Comparative Analysis of  the Net Present Value and 
the Benefit-Cost Ratio as Measures of the Economic Desirability of Investments" . 
Jo urnal of Finance 24 (June 1969) : 507-516 .  
SoLOMON, EZRA. "The Arithmetic of Capital-Budgeting Decisions" .  Journal of Business 29 (April 
1 956) : 124-29. 
WEINGARTNER, H. MARTIN . "Capital Budgeting of Interrelated Projects : Survey and Synthesis " .  
Management Science 1 2  (March 1 966) : 485-51 6. 
---. "The Excess Present Value Index-A Theoretical Basis and Critique". Jo urnal of Acco unt� 
ing Research I (Autumn 1 963) : 213-24. 
WRIGHT, F. K[ENNETII] . "Project Evaluation and the Managerial Limit".  Journal of Business 37 
(April 1 964) : 1 79-85.  
Other m aterial 
COMMONWEALTH BUREAU OF CENSUS AND STATISTICS. Seasonally Adjusted Indicators 1969. Canberra : 
Government Printing Office, 1 969. 
QUEENSLAND STATE GoVERNMENT. The Companies Act of 1961.  Bri sbane : Government Printer 1965. 
